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This report discusses the role, nature and mechanisms of governance in inland 
fisheries. After reviewing the wider concepts of governance, participation and 
co-management in natural resource management, the report then focuses on 
small-scale fisheries and, in particular, on inland artisanal fisheries operating in 
developing countries.
Drawing upon lessons from the literature outside the fisheries sector, the fist part 
of the report reviews and discusses the definitions of governance and ‘good’ 
governance, and highlights some of the main issues related to these concepts, 
before focusing more specifically on issues related to these concepts in fisheries. 
The analysis reveals, in particular, the frequent confusion that is made in the 
fisheries literature between ‘management’ and ‘governance’ and argues that the 
two concepts should be used distinctly.
Part II discusses in greater details governance mechanisms and reforms. The 
report concentrates initially on cases of decentralization reforms in sectors other 
than fisheries and reviews some of the positive but also negative consequences 
of those types of governance reforms. We then focus more specifically on two 
governance  mechanisms,  participation  and  accountability.  The  report  shows 
that while participatory processes can play a key role in improving governance, 
these approaches will not benefit the end-users (and in particular the poor) unless 
efficient downward accountability mechanisms are put in place.
Part III of the report discusses governance reform—in particular co-management—
in fisheries, and raises a series of questions about the implementation of this 
concept for the artisanal fisheries of developing countries. The analysis shows 
that  the  conceptualization  of  co-management  as  currently  presented  in  the 
literature does not provide a particularly useful framework to analyze the reasons 
for success or failure of current decentralization programs in fisheries. The review 
demonstrates that by focusing exclusively on the level of participation as the key-
explanatory element of success (or failure) of these reforms, the current approach 
to co-management neglects some of the other crucial dimensions of governance 
and overlooks the real effect of these reforms on equity and poverty (alleviation).
Part IV draws upon the lessons derived from the three previous sections and 
develops a series of questions for future research. The section highlights the 
role that such research should play in the debate about governance in natural 
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  Governance reforms in fisheries: a critical review
This  report  reviews  the  role,  nature  and  mechanisms  of  governance  in 
inland fisheries. We do so by reviewing first the wider issues of governance, 
participation and co-management in natural resource management, and 
then focus on small-scale fisheries, and, in particular, small-scale (artisanal) 
activities operated within inland (river and adjacent floodplains) areas in 
developing countries. 
Drawing upon lessons from the literature outside the fisheries sector, Part I 
reviews and discusses the definitions of governance and ‘good’ governance, 
and highlights some of the main issues related to these definitions. The 
section then focuses on the concept of governance in fisheries. The analysis 
reveals  the  frequent  confusion  that  is  made  in  the  fisheries  literature 
between ‘management’ and ‘governance’, and argues that the two concepts 
should be used distinctly. 
Part II reviews the mechanisms of change in governance. Decentralization, 
as a governance reform, is used across the first half of this second section to 
identify and discuss issues of governance reforms. The report concentrates 
initially  on  cases  of  natural  resource  management  decentralization  in 
sectors other than fisheries in order to identify some of the positive but also 
negative  consequences  of  governance  reforms.  The  review highlights  in 
particular  that  unless  a  series  of  stringent  conditions  are  present, 
decentralization reforms in natural resource management are likely to fail. 
The second part of the section focuses on two mechanisms that are thought 
to  improve  governance,  namely  participation  and  accountability.  Here 
again, the literature relating to sectors other than fisheries offers relevant 
lessons. In particular, it demonstrated that while participatory approaches 
can  play  a  key  role  in  strengthening  governance,  these  participatory 
processes will not provide end-users with reliable, high-quality and cost-
effective  services  unless  these  end-users  can  exercise  effective  leverage 
through  strong  democratic  mechanisms,  in  particular  downward 
accountability. 
Finally  Part  III  concentrates  on  governance  reform  in  fisheries.  After 
reviewing the origins of decentralization in fisheries, the report focuses on 
co-management, and raises a series of questions about the implementation 
of  this  concept  for  the  artisanal  fisheries  of  developing  countries.  In 
particular, the questions ‘who is the fishing community?’ and ‘who is the 
legitimate  recipient  of  the  newly-devolved  power?’  are  discussed.  The 
analysis shows that the conceptualization of co-management as currently 
summaryvii summAry
presented in the literature does not provide a particularly useful framework 
with  which  to  analyze  the  reasons  for  success  or  failure  of  current 
decentralization programs in fisheries. Drawing upon some of the lessons 
on  governance  and  participation  presented  in  the  first  parts  of  the 
document,  the  review  demonstrates  that  the  current  approach  to  co-
management considers the level of participation as the key explanatory 
element of success (or failure), and thereby neglects some of the other 
crucial  dimensions  of  governance.  In  particular,  it  is  shown  that  the 
approach by assuming that co-management is more ‘equitable’ by nature, 
has generally overlooked the social dimensions of the issue and has not 
attempted to conceptually or empirically address the question of whether 
or not co-management effectively delivers positive impacts in terms of 
poverty alleviation.   
The last section of the report (Part IV) draws upon the lessons derived from 
the three previous sections and develops a series of questions for future 
research. A particular effort is made to link these research questions to 
broader strategic issues using the Logical Framework Approach. The section 
highlights the role that such research in fisheries should play in the more 
general debate about governance in natural resource management. The use 
of the Logical Framework Approach also underlines how this research can 
contribute  more  effectively  to  poverty  alleviation  (particularly  in  rural 
areas),  a  primary  goal  of  the  majority  of  bi-lateral  and  international 
development and donor agencies.
Key-words:  Governance, participation, accountability, co-management, small-scale fisheries, 
developing countries, Africa, Asia.viii  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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Introduction	
Governance is about politics and the way power is distributed between different 
actors within society. It is about how people share decision-making and how this 
affects their abilities to empower themselves and others. The purpose of this 
document is to review and critically discuss the role, nature and mechanisms of 
governance as they operate in small-scale fisheries in developing countries. This 
document is therefore aimed at fisheries scientists and practitioners, senior staff 
of  government  agencies  and  local,  regional,  and  national  decision-makers 
involved  in  the  planning  and  implementation  of  fisheries  management  in 
developing countries.
Governance in fisheries – or the lack of it – is a central issue that affects the 
millions of people engaged in fishing activity, be that in large, industrial operations 
run mainly within or from developed countries – but also, increasingly, from 
developing countries – or in smaller-scale, coastal or inland fisheries, operated 
largely in developing countries. But governance issues in fisheries do not affect  
only primary stakeholders (fishers, fish traders and processors). They also concern 
other  groups  of  stakeholders,  such  as  policy-makers,  development  agencies, 
researchers, planners, local governments, and traditional leaders, who are engaged 
formally  or  informally  at  different  levels  in  the  operation  and  management. 
Paradoxically, these different groups are also the ones that shape and determine 
the  form  of  governance  operating  at  a  particular  time  in  a  particular  place. 
Governance is not simply ‘decided from above’. Governance is shaped at every 
level of society. It would be misleading, therefore, to consider these different 
stakeholders only as passive ‘victims’ of governance failure. They are actors; they 
are part of the governance process.
Background
Although large-scale (industrial or semi-industrial) fisheries contribute a large 
part of the overall economic activity within the sector, the focus of this document 
is on small-scale fisheries and, in particular, on artisanal activities operated within 
inland  (river  and  adjacent  floodplains)  areas  in  developing  countries.  These 
fisheries concern hundreds of thousands of professional fishers (usually young 
men) operating on small, medium or large water-bodies such as rivers, permanent 
or seasonal ponds, flooded plains and lakes. These professional fishers range from 
self-employed  single  operators  which  can  be  considered  as  informal  micro-
enterprises  to  wage-paid  crew-members  employed  as  part  of  more  formal 
businesses. But inland artisanal fishing activities are also undertaken by millions 
of people who engage on a seasonal or opportunistic basis. This includes the 
‘non-leading’ members of households (women, children and elderly people) who 
combine fishing with other domestic activities, but also the fisher-farmers of 2  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
  Governance reforms in fisheries: a critical review
floodplain areas who fish full-time during the flood season before returning to 
farming  activities  once  the  water  has  receded  (Sadeque  1992;  Adams  1993; 
Thomas 1996; Purvis 2001). In all these cases the contribution of fishing to 
household  livelihood  is  substantial.  In  floodplain  areas,  for  instance,  inland 
fishing is part of a diversified livelihood strategy upon which households rely to: 
(i) spread economic risk in an uncertain environment (Sarch and Birkett 2000; 
Béné et al. 2003), and (ii) create synergy between different activities and thereby 
increase both the return on capital and the income opportunities (Barr 1999; 
Neiland  et  al.  2000).  When  compared  with  other  household  activities,  the 
contribution of these fisheries to household cash income often represents a major 
element in the local economy, often generating more cash than cattle-rearing and 
sometimes more than crop production (e.g. Turpie et al. 1999). 
While  fishing  can  generate  significant  wealth  and  act  as  a  catalyst  for  rural 
development, in other circumstances it can also become an activity of ‘last resort’ 
for the rural poor. When other local economic activities are declining or have 
been eroded by the general macro-economic context, fisheries will usually provide 
a safety net for the poor (Panayotou 1982; FAO 1994; FAO 2000). Inland fisheries 
are particularly important in this context, as they are widely distributed and easily 
accessible to marginal and/or isolated communities. 
Finally, for many poor in rural and also urban or peri-urban areas, fish is also very 
often the only accessible and/or affordable source of protein. FAO estimates for 
instance that about 56% of the world population derives 20% or more of their 
animal protein from fish. The protein contribution of fish exceeds 25% in poor 
countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia and Uganda, and can reach 90% in 
remote inland areas. In the Upper Amazon Basin for instance, household surveys 
indicated that fish provide the bulk of the animal protein consumed, with more 
than 200 kg of fish being eaten per person per year (Batista et al. 1998).
Despite these central roles played by inland fisheries in sustaining the livelihoods 
of millions of people in rural areas, there is a growing recognition that present 
governance systems of inland fisheries are weak and ineffective. In many situations, 
the fisheries are fished heavily but the poor are denied appropriate access and use, 
and an increasing number of studies highlight that inland fisheries and the people 
who use them are facing unprecedented threats. The majority of these threats 
however originate outside the fisheries sector such as increased competition with 
livestock for access to permanent or seasonal ponds, alteration of natural river 
flows as irrigation and/or hydro-power dams change both river ecology and access 
to the resource by the downstream population, pollution from burgeoning urban 
populations and industries, and siltation and loss of water quality as a result of 
deforestation. Central to most of these threats is the issue of water governance, 
which is now seen as one of the main forces influencing access to, and management  IntroduCtIon
of, aquatic resources, including fisheries (Dunn 1989; Capistrano et al. 1994; 
Sarch 1998; Van Zalingue et al. 1998; Dugan 2005). 
Structure and content of the report
In addition to reviewing and assessing the literature addressing governance within 
fisheries1  the  present  document  draws  extensively  from  fields  outside  fisheries 
sciences, including political and social sciences related to development issues. Of 
particular relevance are the recent works of Jesse Ribot, Robert Jessop, Mick Moore 
and others at the Institute of Development Studies, and Edwin Brent on various 
aspects of decentralization, poverty, the participatory approach and governance 
reforms. A large part of this report has been influenced by their research findings. 
A few years ago, Adams (1996a, p.1) stated, “In any fisheries review involving the 
term governance, recent experience suggests that it is necessary to define what the 
word actually means”. This is still true today and the first section of the report 
therefore  seeks  to  define  the  concept  of  governance.  Starting  from  a  broad 
perspective, Part I of this document reviews and discusses some of the issues 
related to the definition of governance (and ‘good’ governance) outside fisheries; 
it then focuses more specifically on issues of governance in fisheries. 
Part II reviews the mechanisms of change in governance. ‘Decentralization’, as a 
type of governance reform, is used to identify and discuss issues of governance 
reforms. We concentrate on cases of decentralization of natural resource management 
outside fisheries to discuss some of the positive (and negative) consequences of 
governance reforms. The discussion highlights in particular that, unless a series of 
stringent conditions are present, decentralization in natural resource management 
is likely to fail. The lessons drawn from these examples are of great relevance for 
fisheries governance reforms. The second part of this section focuses on two key 
mechanisms  thought  to  improve  governance,  namely  participation  and 
accountability. Here again, the review of the literature outside the fisheries sector 
offers insightful examples and lessons relevant to fisheries policy analysis. 
Part III of the report concentrates on governance reform in fisheries. After reviewing 
the  origins  of  decentralization  in  fisheries,  the  discussion  focuses  on  co-
management. The report raises, in particular, a series of questions regarding the 
appropriateness of the concept of co-management – initially developed within 
the  strong  state/high  institutional  capacities  context  of  North  American  and 
Scandinavian fisheries – for the artisanal fisheries of developing countries that are 
1 While this review was being finalised, the authors became aware of the research conducted at the same 
time by Allison and Badjeck (2004) on co-management in African inland fisheries. The comprehensive re-
view of Allison and Badjeck provides a useful complement to the present document.  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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characterized  by  a  much  weaker  state  and  lower  institutional  capacities.  In 
particular, questions regarding ‘who is the fishing community?’ and ‘who is the 
legitimate recipient of the newly-devolved power?’ in inland Africa cast doubt on 
the transferability of the concept. 
The analysis shows that the conceptualization of co-management as currently 
presented in the literature does not provide a particularly useful framework with 
which to analyze success or failure of current fisheries decentralization programs. 
Drawing upon lessons derived from the literature on governance and participation 
and presented in the first two sections of the document, the review demonstrates 
that the conceptualization of co-management, while considering the level of 
participation as the key explanatory element of success (or failure), neglects 
some of the other crucial dimensions of governance. In particular we argue that, 
by assuming that co-management is more ‘equitable’ by nature, advocates of the 
model have generally overlooked the social dimensions of co-management, and 
have  not  attempted  to  conceptually  or  empirically  address  the  question  of 
whether or not co-management effectively induces positive impacts in terms of 
poverty alleviation.   
In Part IV we draw upon the lessons from the reviews and analysis in the first 
three parts of the report to develop a series of questions for future research. By 
identifying the links between focused research questions and more global strategic 
issues, we highlight the role that such research in fisheries can play in the more 
general debate about governance in natural resource management, and how it 
can contribute to the overall goal of poverty alleviation. 
Approach and methods used
To  produce  this  document  an  extensive  desk-based  literature  search  was 
undertaken,  mainly  through  on-line  searches  of  the  international  literature. 
Specific  databases  were  accessed  through  the  on-line  BIDS-Ingenta®  system. 
Material  examined  included  published  articles  from  international  journals; 
working  or  research  papers  from  research  centers  (e.g.  CGIAR),  universities, 
international  institutes  and  ‘think-tanks’  (e.g.  International  Institute  for 
Environment and Development, World Resources Institute); and ‘grey’ literature, 
i.e.  consultancy  reports,  documents  from  international  and  local  Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and reports from funding or development 
agencies (e.g. UK-Department for International Development). The content of 
websites of major research institutes (e.g. Institute of Development Studies) and 
international  organizations  (e.g.  UN-organizations,  World  Bank,  European 
Union) were also examined. In total, more than 280 documents were reviewed 
and 216 are explicitly referred to. Geographically, the data cover all the regions 
of the world where issues of natural resource governance have been described 
and analyzed.  PArt	I	|	governance
Part I - Governance
‘Governance’ itself is a contested term. It is used sometimes narrowly by 
planners and development financiers to refer to the efficient functioning of 
government with respect to service provision, or to the maintenance of a 
legal and regulatory framework conducive to private sector growth. In a 
quite different sense, the term has also been adopted by activists and non-
governmental actors … to describe the role of civil society in protecting 
against abuse by the state, private sector, and international development 
agencies” Ratner (2003, p.61)
The concept of governance
The term ‘governance’ is widely used. Politicians, the media, academics, development 
agencies, practitioners and even ‘ordinary’ citizens, all today seem willing to reframe 
their own interpretations of reality through the lens of this concept. However, as 
Ratner’s quote (above) suggests, and as will be confirmed here, the term ‘governance’ 
– in common with such concepts as ‘sustainable development’ or ‘biodiversity’ – is 
now used by many people to mean different things. This confusion comes partly from 
the fact that this concept is not always well defined by those who use it, which leads 
some to argue that “it is becoming a ubiquitous ‘buzzword’ which can mean anything 
or nothing” (Jessop 1998, p.29). The main objective of this first section is therefore to 
review some recent works on governance in an attempt to clarify the concept.
Definitions and concepts
Jessop (1998) recalls that the term ‘governance’ was initially a rather technical 
concept with two closely related meanings. The first one is an encompassing and 
broad meaning in which governance refers to “any mode of co-ordination of 
interdependent activities” (ibid, p.29); the second, more restricted meaning is 
‘self-organization’. Although governance in the sense of self-organization can be 
found at three different levels – interpersonal, inter-organizational, and inter-
systemic  –  the  term  itself  is  often  limited  to  the  second  level,  i.e.,  inter-
organizational. This second meaning (self-organization) is consistent with recent 
usages found in the literature, where definitions of governance refer, in a broader 
sense, to the mode of conduct of specific institutions and organizations with 
multiple stakeholders, and concentrate in particular on the role of public-private 
partnerships  and  other  kinds  of  strategic  alliances  among  autonomous  but 
interdependent organizations. Manor (1999), for instance, defines governance as 
“the sum of interactions between civil society and governments. It is thus a word 
which clearly has a relational dimension” (emphasis by Manor) in which the key 
questions focus on how civil society and government inter-relate, and how that 
inter-relationship might be changed in ways that foster better governance.6  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
  Governance reforms in fisheries: a critical review
Most  definitions  (e.g.  Box  1)  emphasize  two  fundamental  components  of 
governance:  (a)  the  ‘multi-actors  dimension’,  i.e.  the  belief  that  government 
should not be the only actor involved in the governance process, and (b) the 
accommodative  nature  of  the  process,  i.e.  the  belief  that  governance  should 
accommodate the interests and expectations of the majority. Interestingly, Jessop 
(1998)  notes  that  this  interpretation  of  governance  (synonymous  with  inter-
relations amongst the state and other actors in the improved conduct of public 
affairs) is a rather recent one. In its original ‘common’ interpretation, the term 
‘governance’  had  a  much  narrower  meaning,  viz.  the  action  or  manner  of 
governing. Consequently, for a long time, use of the term was mainly limited to 
constitutional and legal issues related to the conduct of ‘affairs of state’. It was 
largely  used  in  an  overlapping  sense  with  ‘government’.  “Governance  means 
‘exercise of authority; control’ or, more broadly, ‘government’” (Brautigam 1991, 
p.3).  Mearns  (1996,  p.333)  points  out  however  that  this  confusion  between 
governance  and  government  is  not  particularly  helpful,  especially  “for 
understanding  governance  issues  outside  the  arena  of  formal  government 
administration, a category in which much local-level natural resource management 
in developing countries may be expected to fall”. He argues that, in the absence of 
government (either because rules have not been devised to deal with specific 
issues  – such as legislation designed to protect the environment – or because 
weak  administrative  capacity  hinders  the  enforcement  of  law  and/or 
Box	1.	definitions	of	governance.
“Governance can be seen as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to 
manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions 
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their 
obligations and mediate their differences” (UNDP 1997, p.2-) .
“Governance may be defined as the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public 
and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or 
diverse interests may be accommodated and a co-operative action may be taken. It includes 
formal  institutions  and  regimes  empowered  to  enforce  compliance  as  well  as  informal 
arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their 
interests” (European Commission 199, p.2).
“Governance denotes the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation 
to the management of its resources for social and economic development. This broad definition 
encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the environment in which economic 
operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the relationship 
between the ruler and the ruled. (OECD 200).
“Governance  is  defined  as  the  systemic  framework  of  social,  economic,  legal  and  political 
structures within which humanity chooses, and/or accepts, to manage its affairs” (World Humanity 
Action Trust WHAT, 2000).7 PArt	I	|	governance
implementation of policy), governance – or the lack of it – becomes entirely a 
question  of  endogenously  evolved  sets  of  rules.  Mearns  therefore  suggests 
distinguishing the two concepts:
“…governance is defined as the exercise of legitimate authority in transacting affairs, 
and  is  broadly  understood  to  refer  to  the  maintenance  of  social  order  through 
endogenously  evolved  and  externally  imposed  rules  sets,  [while]  government 
by contrast can be defined as ‘the exercise of influence and control, through law 
and coercion, over apolitical community, constituted into a state within a defined 
territory” (Healey and Robinson 1992, p.163, quoted in Mearns 1996, p. 300).
With respect to natural resources, government refers to de jure sets of rules – as set 
out in statutory law and state policy relating to natural resource ownership, tenure 
and use – and the administrative framework through which it is implemented. In 
contrast, the broader concept of governance refers to the sum of sets that apply de 
facto. It thus includes the customary rules that also influence access to and control 
over natural resources; the extent to which and manner in which those rules are 
monitored and enforced; and the traditional or other systems of authority through 
which they may be legitimized (Mearns 1996, p.300).
Recognizing  the  distinction  between  governance  and  government  is  therefore 
critical if the understanding of what constitutes governance is to be improved. 
Neiland  and  Béné,  however,  point  out  that  the  close  association  between 
‘governance’ and ‘government’ may represent a useful way to realize the importance 
of government, the nature of the state and the impact of these two important 
elements on different countries throughout the world (2003, p.15). Indeed, if we 
assume that Reynolds2  is correct when he concludes “the single most important 
explanatory  variable  [of  development]  is  political  organization  and  the 
administrative competence of government”, then a large part of governance – and 
thus ‘good governance’ – is strongly related to the capacity of the state and the 
government to conduct their own affairs, and does not simply depend on the civil 
society or the market to take over the government’s responsibilities.
Yet, reviews suggest that the state has become increasingly marginalized in the 
debate on governance, and its perceived inefficacy in the provision of public 
goods and social services has been recurrently amplified (e.g. Esmail 1997, Ayres 
2000).  Conversely  civil  society  has  become  the  “darling  of  rural  developers, 
offering an apparently alternative and acceptable agency to bring about bottom-
up development” (Davies and Hossain 1997, p.3). Today much hope is placed on 
what is conventionally referred to as ‘good governance’ to address the challenging 
problem  of  combining  economic  growth  with  equity  and  poverty  alleviation 
(World Bank 1994; IMF 1997). The question, however, that remains, is: what 
does ensure ‘good governance’?
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The other (hidden) half of “good governance”
Although it is clear that ‘good governance’ is a complex subject, various definitions 
of good governance have started to emerge. “Good governance is, among other 
things,  participatory,  transparent  and  accountable”  (UNDP  1997,  p.3).  These 
three elements (participation, transparency, accountability) seem to have wide 
appeal.  However,  Moore  (2000)  challenges  this  view  and  asserts  that  these 
elements represent only one half of good governance. From Moore’s perspective, 
the ‘governance’ debate is simply a new term to talk about the old problem of 
political (under)-development; and what people call ‘bad governance’ is simply 
synonymous with ‘political underdevelopment’.3
However, as Moore himself admits, referring to ‘political development’ is a risky 
academic challenge nowadays. There are two main reasons for this. One is that 
use  of  the  concept  would  imply  assessment  of  the  performance  of  political 
institutions. However, there is no consensus about which political institutions 
should be taken into account. The other is that, within political science and 
political philosophy there is a deep-rooted and fundamental division in relation 
to authoritative political institutions, especially to the state. On one side, liberals 
view state power primarily as a (potential) threat to the wellbeing of citizens, and 
define ‘good governance’ primarily in terms of legal, constitutional and other 
arrangements that protect against this threat (Poggi 1978; Roseneau and Czempiel 
1992). Consequently, liberals warm to terms like responsiveness, accountability, 
democracy and participation – i.e. the conventional definition of good governance. 
By contrast, statists see the state primarily as a means to aggregate power and 
resources  for  the  collective  good.  They  view  the  weakness  of  government  – 
manifested as disorder, vulnerability to external threat, or failure to provide public 
services – as the prime potential problem. Statists therefore tend to think of ‘good 
governance’ in terms of arrangements that promote the coherence and effectiveness 
of the state. They refer to terms like authority, order, capability and autonomy. 
“Evidently,” Moore regrets, “for ‘diplomatic’ reasons, ‘political development’ has 
not  entered  into  the  contemporary  vocabulary  of  international  organizations 
concerned about issues they label as ‘governance’” (Ibid, p.4). 
Beyond this regret, Moore’s analysis is useful in pointing out another ‘hidden’ 
aspect of the debate on governance, namely, the tendency nowadays for only the 
liberal dimension of good governance to be promoted to the detriment of the 
statist approach. In practice, however, these two kinds of governance characteristics 
(liberal and statist) tend to go hand-in-hand. States which are unable to rule 
3 “Political underdevelopment [refers to] a particular set of acute problems: the consequences of the weak-
ness, ineffectiveness, repressiveness and arbitrariness of public authority over significant parts of the poor 
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many of their citizens or pursue any kind of collective interest in an authoritative 
fashion  (static  criteria)  tend  also  to  be  relatively  arbitrary,  despotic  and 
unaccountable (liberal criteria). Conversely, states that display high liberal values 
(responsiveness, accountability, democracy, etc.) also tend to score high on statist 
values (authority, order, capability, etc.). Despite this reality, it seems that people 
focus more readily (or exclusively) on the liberal dimension of good governance, 
neglecting the other half of the concept. 
In the light of this last point, one would certainly agree with Moore that a more 
useful definition of good governance should be one which recognizes as ‘politically 
underdeveloped’ (i.e. with ‘weak governance’) those countries that score low on 
both statist and liberal dimensions (ibid p.4). Having said that, it should also be 
pointed out that in the specific case of natural resource management, in those 
‘politically underdeveloped’ countries it might be useful to step back and ask the 
question: which of these two dimensions of bad governance is prevalent – the 
misrule and abuse of resource users by the state (liberal dimension) or the state’s 
inability to manage the resources (statist definition)? Answering this question 
would help identify policies better suited to addressing issues of ‘bad governance’ 
in the domain of natural resource management. 
Governance in fisheries
The previous section attempted to clarify the concepts of governance and good 
governance in a general context. We ended up, however, with a more specific 
question  related  to  the  nature  of  (good)  governance  in  natural  resource 
management.  The  present  section  pursues  this  discussion  in  the  context  of 
‘fisheries’, and seeks to refine the concept of governance within that specific context. 
We focus on small-scale river fisheries in developing countries. The number of 
documents addressing the issue of governance in the case of small-scale inland 
fisheries is rather limited. However, interesting lessons can be drawn from analyses 
based upon, or referring to, larger-scale fisheries in developed countries. 
Management and governance: Are they the same thing?
An interesting starting point for any investigation of fisheries governance is the 
question raised by Adams (1996a, p.1), viz. “Should we use the terms fisheries 
management  and  fisheries  governance  interchangeably?”  In  other  words,  is 
(fisheries) governance synonymous with (fisheries) management?
For a large number of scholars the two concepts (governance and management) 
are closely related, or even synonymous. McGlade (2001), in her plea for a change 
in  fisheries  governance,  states,  “…the  conclusion  is  drawn  that  without  a 
fundamental change in our views on governance, and hence management, many of 
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2001, p.1 – our emphasis). Adams (1996a, p.1) is even more assertive, “Governance 
in fishery … must be the way in which the fishery is managed, by whoever is 
managing it”. However, if it is the case that governance in fisheries is simply “the 
way fisheries are managed”, then the two terms become interchangeable and the 
intrusion of ‘governance’ into the fishery science lexicon is not very useful. It is 
likely to add to the confusion, rather than to improve our understanding of the 
situation.  Indeed,  if  “management  =  governance”,  then  management  tools 
become solutions for governance problems. This intellectual ‘shortcut’ is indeed 
what  was  observed  recently  in  the  report  proposed  by  the  Commission  on 
Fisheries Resources as Part II of the WHAT (World Humanity Action Trust) Report. 
The Commission, made up of international experts in fisheries, had been asked 
to express its informed opinion on the question of governance in fisheries. In the 
first paragraph of the report, it is stated: 
“…  the  Commission  concludes  that  effective  governance  of  fisheries  requires  the 
assignment of enforceable rights to shares of fisheries. The importance of rights has 
been well known for decades, yet rights are either ineffective or non-existent for most 
of the world’s fisheries. As a results many fishery resources have been overfished and 
tens of billions of dollars in economic benefits are wasted annually” (Commission on 
Fisheries WHAT report 2000 p.8). 
On the basis of this statement it would be possible for somebody with little or no 
experience in fisheries to conclude that (a) it is the lack of effective governance that 
leads to the overexploitation of the resources and the dissipation of economic rent 
and (b) the solution to this lack of effective governance is the “assignment of 
enforceable rights”. Yet the dissipation of economic rent (which can indeed ensue 
from a lack of right enforcement) is an economic issue that has little to do with 
governance.  Assuming  such  a  causal  relationship  would  reflect  a  misleading 
connection between economic considerations and political issues. In fact, the 
enforcement of rights (property but also use rights) has been promoted for decades 
by fisheries academics for management purposes, not governance purposes.4 
Our view is that the two concepts (management and governance) are related but 
different and that a clear distinction needs to be made if both management and 
governance issues are to be addressed in an appropriate manner. Management is 
about  action,  governance  is  about  politics.  Management  is  about  the 
implementation -in a technocratic sense- of decisions and actions in accordance 
with  rules  (these  decisions  and  actions  do  not  have  to  be  restricted  to  the 
4 Evidence of this confusion between management and governance is further confirmed by the list of “alternative 
approaches to fisheries governance” considered by the Commission (ibid, pp.42-47). These alternatives 
included,  (in the order they appear in the report), (a) (End of) subsidies, (b) Ecosystem-based management, 
(c) Marine protected areas, (d) Artificial reefs, (e) Enhancement and aquaculture (f) Community-based 
management (g) Co-management or participatory management and (h) Eco-labelling. With the exception 
of “Community-based management” and “Co-management or participatory management”, both of which 
address governance issues, all the other “alternatives” are classic management tools.11 PArt	I	|	governance
implementation of the management tools per se, they can also relate to planning 
and assessment). Governance is about sharing responsibility and power; it is 
about  setting  the  policy  agenda  and  objectives  and  about  the  processes  of 
implementing management actions. 
The  difficulty  of  trying  to  conceptualize  management  and  governance  using 
fisheries  as  the  entry  point  is  evident  in  the  literature.  For  example,  Hanna 
(1999),  in  an  article  entitled  ‘Strengthening  governance  of  ocean  fishery 
resources’, states: 
“… a fishery has economic, social, cultural, biological and ecological components. The 
scope of fishery governance may encompass one, some or all of these categories and 
except for rare situations where marine ecosystems are relatively untouched, will be 
forced to deal either directly or indirectly with the tradeoffs between them” (p.279).  
However, an alternative view is that governance has nothing to do with many of 
these components (e.g. ecological processes or biology). The proof is that usual 
indicators  of  good  governance  are  “transparency”,  “accountability”,  and 
“participation”; they are not “sustainability”, “biodiversity” or “conservation”. If it 
is correct that one potential consequence of (bad) governance in fisheries is the 
over-exploitation  of  the  resources,  it  can  equally  be  argued  that  a  ‘perfect’ 
governance system – i.e. one with total accountability, full participation, and 
absolute transparency – can also lead to the complete depletion or destruction of 
(natural) resources if this is the objective initially agreed by society. Governance is 
one thing; management (and conservation) of the natural resources is another.
Mixing them together benefits neither the resource management agenda, nor the 
governance debate. 
The  distinction  between  management  and  governance  can  also  be  reasserted 
using a more formalized approach. In their conceptual analysis of property rights 
and common property resources, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) attempt to clarify 
some of the concepts used in natural (common-pool) resources research. In their 
framework,5 they distinguish three levels of rules, which they term ‘operational 
level’, ‘collective-choice level’, and ‘constitutional-choice level’. Every one of these 
levels is associated with different rights. The “right to management” — defined as 
“the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making 
improvement” (p.251) — is a right (along with the “right of exclusion” and the 
“right of alienation”) that takes place at the collective-choice level. Schlager and 
Ostrom state “The right of management is a collective-choice right (…). Individuals 
who hold rights of management have the authority to determine how, when and 
where harvesting from a resource may occur” (ibid, p.251, authors’ italics). But the 
right to determine who hold these management rights belongs to the third level 
5 See also Kiser and Ostrom (1982) and Ostrom et al. (1994, pp.46-47). 12  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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– i.e. the “constitutional level”. Constitutional-choice rules are about “determining 
who is eligible and the rules to be used in crafting the sets of collective-choice 
rules” (p.46 in Ostrom et al., 1994 – our emphasis). Devising collective-choice 
rules —  in other words, deciding who can manage  —  is, therefore, a constitutional-
choice action. This is what we call governance, i.e. the mechanisms and processes 
by which power and decision-making are allocated amongst the different actors. 
The  constitutional-choice  level  is  therefore  the  level  at  which  governance 
arrangements are designed and/or modified, whereas the collective-choice level is 
where  management  rights  are  designed  and/or  modified.  Management  and 
governance are exercised at different levels. 
New approaches to governance analysis
The previous section has emphasized that, although ‘natural resource management’ 
and  ‘natural  resource  governance’  are  closely  connected  and  share  common 
elements,  they  are  different  concepts  that  need  to  be  distinguished  both 
theoretically  and  empirically.  What  is  requested  therefore,  to  improve  our 
understanding about issues related to governance in fisheries, is a shift in emphasis 
away from natural resource management sciences toward sciences that are more 
suitable  to  analyze  and  address  political  and  power  issues,  such  as  political 
economy, political ecology, policy analysis, or even socio-anthropology.
Interestingly, the increasing attention being given to the concept of governance is 
occurring at the same time as an important evolution in research themes within 
various other disciplines. Policy analysis, for instance, has recently moved away 
from legislative and administrative analysis and toward analysis of interactions 
between actors, networks and the balance and distribution of power among these 
different actors (Hill 1997; John 1998; Keeley and Sconnes 1999). In that sense, 
it comes closer to concerns raised by scholars of political science, for whom 
power and its distribution are considered as a central element in the analysis of 
natural resource management (see, for instance, Broad 1995; Brown and Rosendo 
2000; Le Billon 2000; Robbins 2000). Furthermore, ‘new’ science, such as political 
ecology,  has  recently  emerged,  with  the  explicit  objective  of  analyzing  the 
interactions  between  society  and  the  environment,  especially  how  the 
environment — and societal issues related to environment, e.g. exploitation, 
pollution, access, etc., — are politicized and how these issues affect the welfare 
of those who depend on natural resources for their livelihoods (Blaikie and 
Brookfield 1987; Greenberg and Park 1994; Bryant 1998; Stonish and Bailey 
2000;  Castree  2002).  These  different  sciences  (political  economy,  political 
ecology and policy analysis), have, however, remained very marginalized and 
been  almost  ignored  within  the  ‘bio-economic/management  science-focused’ 
domain of fisheries research. It is increasingly evident that these disciplines offer 1 PArt	I	|	governance
new perspectives that represent the foundations for a better understanding of 
natural resource, and fisheries, governance.
Finally, it should be observed that there is an increasing level of international 
cooperation between scholars and development practitioners from developed 
and developing countries. Most early development projects focused on providing 
technical assistance to countries in areas such as agriculture and fisheries, in order 
to increase production and output. However, the variable performance of these 
projects, and the need to seek alternative strategies for sustainable development, 
have led to a broadening of the approach to development projects – including 
work  in  the  areas  of  social  development,  institutional  design  and  capacity-
building.  Inevitably,  this  work  has  involved  a  consideration  and  analysis  of 
governance. In many developing countries, international projects and their local 
counterpart  organizations  have  built  up  a  detailed  pragmatic  knowledge  of 
governance issues by working and attempting to change the system from within, 
for  example,  by  identifying  and  targeting  the  constraints  to  natural  resource 
management  within  national  bureaucracies.  The  empirical  knowledge  and 
pragmatic experience built up through these activities, and now well-established 
in  international  and  local  organizations  and  programs,  represents  a  valuable 
resource  for  designing  future  actions  in  the  area  of  governance  reform,  and 
mechanisms must be found to access, learn from, and use this information and 
knowledge, which rarely appears in the international academic literature.1  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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Part II - Changes in governance
Good governance is essential for achieving most development goals. Increasingly, 
more attention is being given to identifying the changes in governance that can 
improve the ways public and state affairs are conducted. From a conceptual point 
of view, however, it is important to distinguish between governance reform and 
governance mechanisms. 
Reforms concern changes in the governance system itself, i.e. changes in the form 
of governance, usually aimed at shifts in the distribution of decision-making 
power amongst different actors. For instance, decentralization is a governance 
reform;  it  affects  the  system  of  governance,  in  particular  the  structures  of  the 
institutions  involved  in  governance  and  the  distribution  of  power  between  the 
different actors (usually through modifications of existing law and promulgation 
of new ones). Box 2  illustrates a case of governance reform in wildlife management 
in Botswana. 
Mechanisms,  on  the  other  hand  (in  the  sense  ‘mechanisms  which  improve 
governance’)  affect,  or  act  upon,  governance  processes.  For  this,  they  do  not 
necessarily require a change in the form of governance – they are more likely to 
affect the governance level. Accountability, for instance, is a mechanism affecting 
governance; participation is another. These different mechanisms can be promoted 
without necessarily inducing changes in the governance system, but still lead to 
better governance. Box 3 illustrates an example in Mali where local governance 
was  improved  in  rangeland  management  without  modifying  the  existing 
distribution of power, by improving information flow and introducing conflict 
resolution mechanisms.  
Botswana has seen a decade of policy development aimed at achieving community-based 
control, especially in the wildlife sector. The Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992 
laid the foundation for Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). Community 
Hunting Areas, defined by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks and the Ministry of 
Local Government, Lands and Housing, are the “units of production” for which community-
based organizations can apply for leases. The communities have to organize themselves into 
representative and legal bodies such as trusts or co-operatives. A clearly laid-out constitution 
has to be developed and appropriate by-laws defined. After the communities have prepared 
land-use and management plans conforming to the Wildlife Management Area regulations, 
a 1-year lease can be obtained. While the policies and regulations for wildlife-use are highly 
progressive, those for other resources are not. Few comprehensive development strategies have 
been designed for community tourism (under the Department of Tourism) or for woodlands, 
fisheries and other products (Ministry of Agriculture).
Box	2.	governance	reform:	The case of Botswana wildlife management
Source: Shackleton and Campbell (2001)1 PArt	II	|	Changes	in	governance
In the next two sections, governance reforms and governance mechanisms will be 
discussed separately.
Governance reforms: The case of decentralization
In reviewing governance reforms, it is essential to consider the case of decentralization. 
Not only is decentralization a governance reform by nature,6  but it is also a primary 
focus  of  the  current  reform  paradigm  promoted  by  international  (donor  or 
development) agencies, international and national NGOs, national governments 
and a large part of ‘civil society’ in both developed and developing countries. A rich 
international literature has developed on the many forms and intents of these reforms 
The GTZ-supported Burkina Sahel Programme (PSB) was initiated in 1991 to improve natural 
resource management and people’s livelihoods. The project initially followed a participatory, 
community-based land use planning approach (gestion des terroirs), but found it inadequate to 
deal with the social and ecological complexities of the region. Pastoralists who seasonally moved 
livestock to regions of different climate were not represented, social relations between groups 
were affecting project outcomes in a way that project staff was unable to understand, and the 
management of common-pool assets was problematic. Activities were therefore put ‘on hold’ for 
a year while the project approach and methods were reviewed and a new strategy developed 
that focused on social groups rather than territorial units. 
With conflicts and rivalries simmering amongst almost every ethnic group in Beiga, the challenge 
was to create a situation in which all stakeholders would not only agree to participate in the 
consultative process but also to respect each other’s rights to voice their needs and feelings. 
A consultative committee emerged, with representation from multiple villages, hamlets, and 
other stakeholder groups. It appeared to be instrumental in, for example, resolving disputes 
over management of water pumps – which had soured relationships between the groups – and 
has set up a system for resolving disputes over damage to fields. Negotiating skills were the key 
to greater autonomy for the committee, and the expertise gained through its dealings with 
technical and financial partners has enabled it to mobilize resources for micro-projects on socio-
economic issues and on the protection of natural resources.  
In its first year, the committee drew up a set of rules for the use of resources, such as post-harvest 
grazing, bouli (man-made water holes), salt licks, and the protection of trees and natural water 
points. So-called ‘outpost committees’ and representatives from each hamlet are responsible for 
following up and enforcing regulations. The new approach acknowledged the local tensions and 
rivalries and other historic origins. 
The willingness of people to confront the underlying historical, social and cultural factors in current 
resource use and management practices was an important factor contributing to the success of 
the consultative process. Other factors include finding appropriate entry points for discussion 
through establishing platforms for negotiation and consultation,  building partnerships and 
supporting legitimate local leaders and resource people.
Box 3:  Change in governance mechanisms: The example of the PSB programme in Burkina
Source: Banzharf et al. (2000)
6  Some would argue that decentralisation is a policy reform. This is incorrect. In a decentralisation process, 
policy reforms are the means, i.e. the instruments, while governance, political, economic and/or institu-
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and their development impacts. Among the many incentives to decentralize, one of 
the most common is a desire to improve the efficiency of government administration 
and delivery of public services (Esmail 1997; Goldman 1998; Ayres 2000). 
Rationale for decentralization
Conventionally, the literature recognizes that two main ‘schools of thought’ have 
largely contributed to the promotion of decentralization. They are based, however, 
on rather different theoretical and/or philosophical grounds and pursue different, 
if not incompatible, objectives. One school relies on public choice theory and its 
concern for the provision of public services and economic efficiency, the other on 
the agenda of donor and international agencies and their objectives of good 
governance and the empowerment of the poor.
Public choice analysts contend that, under conditions of reasonably free choice, 
the provision of some public goods (e.g. health, education, public transport) is 
economically more efficient when a large number of local actors are involved 
than  when  the  central  government  is  the  only  provider.  According  to  this 
approach,  decentralization,  by  contracting  services  out  to  the  private  and 
voluntary  sectors,  is  thought  to  free  providers  of  cumbersome  government 
hierarchies, and the services will be more efficiently provided because, it is argued, 
their provision will be linked to performance-based indicators. Furthermore, in 
the very few circumstances where it may be critical for the state to manage and 
allocate  resources,  public  choice  theory  states  that  this  is  best  done  at  a 
decentralized level, so that services can be matched more closely to demand. In 
particular, in developing countries, where there is a lack of infrastructure and 
public services outside the national capital, decentralization is seen as the way to 
improve the provision and maintenance of these infrastructures and services. In 
fact, as remarked by Rondinelli et al. (1989, p.58), in public choice theory the 
rationale of and/or justification for decentralization has rarely, or never, been 
questioned; the question focuses rather on the best (i.e. most cost-effective) way 
to implement decentralization. 
Another major promoter of decentralization reforms has been the donors’ agenda, 
especially in promoting ‘good governance’ reforms. During the 1980s, donors 
began to pressure developing countries to promote good governance through 
democratization and decentralization. Decentralization was presented as a pre-
condition  for  effective  rural  development  (Aiyar  et  al.  1995;  Esmail  1997; 
Goldman 1998; ECDPM 2001). In this approach, participation and decentralization 
were considered as instruments to enable the inclusion of the greatest number of 
citizens – in particular the most marginalized and poorest in terms of decision-
making and access to socio-economic resources. The World Bank, for instance, in 
its World Development Report on the role of “the state in a changing world” 
(1997, p.105) affirms that decentralization is a means of “bringing the state closer 17 PArt	II	|	Changes	in	governance
to the people”. As such, decentralization is seen as a central tool for poverty 
reduction (e.g. ECDPM 1999; World Bank 2000; IFAD 2001) and a strong and 
effective way to promote ‘good governance’. For illustration, in its Guidance Sheets 
on Policy Reforms, the Department for International Development (DFID 1999, 
section 5.5) states:
“Many  examples  of  decentralization,  or  more  broadly  ‘designing  structure  and 
programmes such that they strengthen the hand of local-level civil society advocates 
for the poor’ have proven positive. .... Transparency in central-local disbursements, 
incentives for good performance, and information sharing on the performance of 
local government have increased accountability and responsiveness to the needs of 
poor and marginalized people”.
Baumann (2000), however, argues that, in so far as these can be identified, 
donors’ views are influenced by public choice theory and the need for economic 
pressure on governments in relation to structural adjustment. He also points out 
that the Word Development Report argues that the rationale for decentralization 
is similar to the rationale for ‘liberalization, privatization, and other market 
reforms’  and  its  argument  for  political  decentralization  on  the  grounds  of 
economic efficiency.7
Cutting across all these reforms, however, is the idea that some form of increased 
public participation in local environment and development decision-making will 
increase policy effectiveness. “Owing partly to the implementation failures of 
non-participatory development approaches in the past and partly to pressures 
from civil society, a broad rhetoric of participation has therefore developed among 
international  donors  and,  increasingly,  among  governments”  (Dupar  and 
Barenoch  2002,  p.41).  The  popularity  of  the  concept  is  reflected  in  its 
institutionalization in the World Bank, where a major working group has been 
dedicated  to  participation  (World  Bank  1998)  and  the  World  Bank’s  rural 
development  strategy  has  explicitly  promoted  a  highly  decentralized  and 
participatory approach since the end of the 1990s (Piriou-Sall 1998).
Natural resource management and decentralization
In the natural resource management sectors, recognition of the inadequacy of 
governmental agencies in ensuring sustainable practices has provided an argument 
for  greater  involvement  of  the  local  communities  and  civil  society  in  the 
management of those resources (Lawry 1990; Ostrom 1990; Vedeld 1992; IIED 
1994;  Mearns  1996;  Ainslie  1999;  Campbell  et  al.  1999).  Decentralization 
programs in ministries or departments of agriculture, forestry, water, and fisheries 
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have been initiated in dozens of countries across the world as illustrated for water 
in Box 4. 
In NRM, the plea for devolution is usually grounded in three arguments, (i) the 
limited effectiveness of government institutions in managing natural resources, 
especially at the local level; (ii) the ability of local institutions to develop well-
adapted rules and regulations that enable them to effectively manage natural 
resources; and (iii) the cost-effectiveness of devolution due to a reduction in 
transaction costs associated with the management of common resources (Berkes 
1989; Vedeld 1992; Baland and Platteau 1996). In addition, NRM is believed to 
be a better target for decentralization because natural resources are seen as sources 
of wealth, which can be used to finance both local government and development. 
In contrast, other sectors that are frequently decentralized – such as health or 
education – are seen as sinks rather than sources of income.
Devolution of managerial functions in natural resources sectors may also be more 
appropriate  than  devolution  in  other  sectors  for  two  main  reasons.  The  first 
reason is that natural resources are often locally specific, diverse, and with multiple 
uses, and so designing their management requires local knowledge. The second 
reason is that access to natural resources involves consideration of existing, new, 
and often multiple overlapping claims that can generate conflicts requiring local 
mediation. Local governments or institutions therefore, are in a better position 
than  centralized  ones  to  deliver  these  functions.  Altogether,  these  conditions 
explain why many natural resource management decisions are best made at the 
local level. The responsibility for making those decisions can be transferred to 
local authorities, so that power over natural resource management and use can 
Largely  driven  by  government  fiscal  shortages  and  a  common  inability  to  raise  sufficient 
revenues  from  collection  of  water  charges,  an  increasing  number  of  governments  around 
the world have adopted programs to devolve responsibilities for irrigation management to 
water  user  associations.  Consistent  with  general  structural  adjustment  strategies,  irrigation 
management  transfer  (IMT)  programmes  have  been  supported  by  the  major  international 
development banks. IMT is taking place in many countries in Asia, Africa, the Americas and the 
Pacific. Early efforts to transfer management from government to farmer organizations occurred 
in the USA, France, Colombia and Taiwan in the 190s, 1960s, and 1970s. Management transfer 
became a national strategy in developing countries only in the 1980s and 1990s, with Chile, Peru, 
Mexico, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Sudan, 
Somalia, Madagascar, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Lao, Vietnam, China, Indonesia 
and the Philippines. This has been referred to as ‘turnover’ in Indonesia and the Philippines, 
‘management transfer’ in Mexico and Turkey, ‘privatization’ in Bangladesh, ‘disengagement’ in 
Senegal, ‘post responsibility system’ in China, ‘participatory management’ in India and Sri Lanka, 
‘commercialization’ in Nigeria and ‘self-management’ in Niger.
Box 4: Decentralization in NRM: Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) programmes across the world
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support and be supported by local democratic processes. One example where 
decentralization may be considered to have led to relatively successful management 
of natural resources is the case of forest decentralized management programme in 
Nepal (see Box 5).
Despite  these  positive  aspects,  the  literature  also  reports  a  great  number  of 
examples where decentralization reforms involving natural resources have been 
problematic or even disastrous (Beach 2001; Ngaido and Kirk 2001; Campbell 
and Shackleton 2002; Ribot 1999, 2002; Lind and Cappon 2001; Dupar and 
Badenoch 2002; Oyono 2002; Wily 2002). Those different studies demonstrate in 
particular that from a political and institutional side, three policy constraints can 
undermine  the  potential  benefits  of  increased  local  representation.  Those 
constraints are: (i) the lack of clarity about how to implement the reforms; (ii) 
insufficient flexibility to allow a range of local environmentally beneficial natural 
resources practices; and (iii) the central governments’ unwillingness to ‘hand 
back’  productive  natural  resources  to  local  people.  These  issues  of  political 
economy and institutional constraints will be dealt with in greater detail in the 
next  section.  At  the  same  time,  the  literature  also  emphasizes  that  policy  or 
institutional  issues  are  not  the  only  types  of  problems  faced  by  NRM 
decentralization  reforms.  Ecological  or  biophysical  constraints  may  also  be 
important.  One  obvious  and  fundamental  constraint  is  that  ecosystems 
(watersheds, forest, rangeland or river ecosystems) rarely fall within a single local 
political or administrative jurisdiction. 
In Nepal, official support for community-based management of forestry began with several pilot 
projects in the late 1970s, and was strengthened by the 199 Forest Act, which transferred full 
managerial control over local forest areas to Forest User Groups (FUGs). Over 11 000 FUGs have 
been registered, managing some 900 000 ha of forest and including over one million households 
(predominantly in middle hill areas),  which is a substantial proportion of the country’s total 
forest-adjacent population. To ensure that FUGs could ultimately derive strength through higher-
level collective action, as well as learn from the experiences of other comparable groups, in 1996 
the National Federation of Community Forestry Users (FECOFUN) was founded as a national-
level networking organization, representing over 2 700 user groups from at least 60 of Nepal’s 
7 districts. It has become a mass social movement, with . million members - nearly half of the 
nation’s 8 million community forestry participants.
Mostly managing degraded forests, these FUGs have achieved remarkable successes in both 
forest regeneration and in strengthening livelihoods by improving poor people’s access to all 
kinds of key assets, including social and financial capital, skills, infrastructure, and forest resources. 
A current concern, however, is that there are now pressures from state forest officials to gain 
more control over the regenerated forests and to prevent the spread of community forestry to 
the lowland forest areas that have stronger potential for production of high-value timber. Local 
government bodies have also begun complaining that FUGs have better assets than they do.
Box 5: An NRM decentralization success story: The case of forest management in Nepal
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In practice, decentralization reforms in NRM might not always have achieved 
their initial objectives (Campbell and Shackleton 2002; Dupar and Badenoch 
2002; Mearns and Bruce 2002; Ribot 2002). In particular, NRM decentralization 
results frequently in the creation of more local conflicts and social tensions (very 
often adding to the original ones) (e.g. Ngaido and Kirk 2001), and leads to a 
range  of  environmental  externalities,  waste  or  even  overexploitation  of  the 
resources (e.g. Campbell 1997; Beach 2001; Mearns 2002). Recent reviews of 
decentralization in Cameroon, Indonesia, and Uganda, for instance, reveal that 
transferring use rights to local bodies has resulted in overexploitation of timber, 
primarily due to the needs of local governments and local people for income 
(Oyono 2002; Resosudarmo 2002). In fact, as pointed out by Ribot (2002), there 
is no reason to expect that local authorities will not convert natural wealth into 
financial wealth, especially where cash is in short supply and is viewed as more 
valuable than standing forests. Underlying this is the issue of revenue shortage 
and fiscal pressure faced by a large number of decentralized governments. A very 
good illustration of this is the case of China, where recent studies demonstrated 
how an effective administrative decentralization that is not supported by effective 
financial decentralization may lead to devastating results in terms of resource 
conservation (see Box 6). 
Ironically, in some countries a backlash is already forming against natural resource 
decentralization  reforms.  Environmental  agencies  in  Uganda,  Indonesia, 
Botswana, Nicaragua, and elsewhere have argued that too much decentralization 
has caused damage or overexploitation (reported in Lind and Cappon 2001; Ribot 
2002; Shackleton et al. 2002). Some would certainly consider that these calls to 
China’s fiscal decentralization reforms, enacted in 1980, required local governments to generate 
their own revenue for development activities. This step strongly increased the incentives for local 
governments (from the province to the township level) to pursue quick revenue-generating 
activities. Much work on the subject of China’s decentralization has emphasized how local 
government’s focus on revenue generation has detracted from economic growth objectives 
and encouraged devastating environmental short-sightedness.  Fiscal pressures in other areas 
have led local governments to promote cash crops in monoculture plantations without regard 
for social or environmental factors. Cash-strapped local governments are not motivated to 
enforce national pollution control laws (Campbell 1997); indeed, they see local livelihoods and 
environmental  management  as  being  at  odds.  Officials  believe  that  policing  industries  for 
good environmental performance distracts them from more important development priorities. 
Self interest may be involved too; local officials often have interests in privately held Township 
and  Village  Enterprises  (TVEs),  which  comprise  the  most  polluting  actors  in  China’s  rural 
landscape (Jahiel 1998). Revenue shortages also discourage local governments from investing 
in environmental infrastructure, such as wastewater treatment and solid waste collection and 
disposal (Beach 2001).
Box 6: Constraint to successful decentralization: The issue of revenue shortages and fiscal pressures
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re-establish central control over natural resources are premature, but whether or 
not it is justified, these examples are of great interest for governance reform in 
fisheries, and in particular for co-management (as will be discussed in Part III of 
this document). The calls show that the disadvantages of decentralization should 
not be overlooked or considered exceptions. Some would even argue that they are 
the general rule, while success is the exception. In any case, lessons can be learned 
from these experiences of decentralization.
Lessons from past experiences
The transfer issue, or the “dilemma of decentralized rural development”
The transfer of power to accountable and representative local institutions is a 
necessary element of effective decentralization. However, in the environmental 
arena, central governments’ resistance to decentralization can be considerable 
and result in transfer of only limited and tightly specified powers or consist in 
imposing  non-representative  local  institutions  to  receive  those  powers.  As  a 
result, authority over natural and financial resources allocated to local authorities 
is often extremely limited and highly controlled through excessive monitoring 
and the enforcement of management planning requirements. As illustrated in 
the case of wildlife local units in Zambia (see Box 7), these powers are also often 
transferred to local institutions and organizations that are not systematically 
accountable to local populations, and are instead often upwardly accountable to 
central authorities.
In Zambia, local government districts (District Councils) and sub-districts (Ward Development 
Committees) have little direct involvement in NRM. This responsibility is assumed by a set of 
organizations  aligned  to  the  Department  of  National  Parks  and Wildlife  Services  (DNPWS). 
These organizations vary between Game Management Areas (GMAs), resulting in a complex 
and confusing institutional set-up. In the Mumbwa GMA, for instance, the Wildlife Management 
Authority caters for stakeholders at district level and consists of district councilors, parks wardens, 
chiefs, indunas [local customary leaders], members of parliament, prominent personalities, district 
representatives of line ministries, and unit leaders. The unit leaders are government officers from 
the DNPWS, trained to administer the program in GMAs. They have two (conflicting) roles. On 
the one hand they are community extension officers, conducting sub-authority meetings and 
coordinating development projects, and on the other they enforce the law on behalf of the state. 
They are seen as extensions of the state whose functions are to coerce and pacify local people. 
Consequently, the attitude of community members towards CBNRM is largely negative. In many 
areas, local people perceive the wildlife programme as a wildlife department initiative, rather 
than a community-based programme. 
Box 7: Lack of accountability: The example of the wildlife local units in Zambia
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The  literature  also  indicates  that  when  self-interested,  non-representative  or 
autocratic institutions such as interest groups, NGOs or customary authorities are 
chosen  as  overseers,  rather  than  representative  bodies,  there  is  a  risk  of 
strengthening  their  autocracy  and  even  weakening  democracy  (Fisher  1997; 
Kassibo  2000;  Shackleton  and  Campbell  2001).  This  is  the  “dilemma  of 
decentralized rural development” described by Abraham and Platteau (2000). 
Drawing upon Esman and Uphoff (1984), Abraham and Platteau describe the 
current strategy of decentralization adopted by central government and/or donor 
agencies,  which,  in  the  absence  of  appropriate  human  resources,  consists  of 
channeling  down  resources  through  the  ‘second-best’  (by  default)  recipients, 
namely the local leaders. In their essay they argue that:
“The method generally used by donor agencies to circumvent the scarcity of institutional 
organizers consists of asking rural communities or specific groups to ‘elect’ leaders. 
For a reason well-explained by Esman and Uphoff (1984), however, such a solution 
is bound to produce perverse results and to be self-defeating: ‘The most prominent 
members are invariably selected and then given training and control over resources 
for  the  community,  without  any  detailed  and  extended  communication  with  the 
other members about objectives, rights or duties. Creating the groups through these 
leaders, in effect, established a power relationship that is open to abuse.’ (Esman and 
Upoff, 1984, p.249). The dilemma of how to achieve rapid and visible results with 
a limited numbers of institutional organizers is thus translated into another, equally 
tricky quandary: acting through local leaders enables outside agencies to channel 
considerable amount of resources towards rural communities in a short span of time, 
yet at the same time it creates a serious risk of an enormous misuse of these resources 
by local elites which stand reinforced in the process. In lineage-based societies local 
chiefs and elders from dominant lineages are ideally positioned to thus ‘capture’ 
the benefits of decentralized development programs.” (Abraham and Platteau 2000,      
p. 20-21)
Elite capture
Elite capture is probably the most frequent pitfall in decentralization reform. 
Both ‘grey’ and published literatures provide many examples of how local elite 
groups have (re)captured the benefits of decentralization projects for their own 
use (Moore and Putzel 1999; Dreze and Sen 1995; Abraham and Platteau 2000; 
Crook and Sverrisson 2001). This elite capture phenomenon is usually the result 
of power being devolved where institutional capacities are lacking within the 
community. Chiefs, headmen and other so-called “customary authorities” are 
often targeted by central governments, donors, and NGOs as appropriate local 
authorities  in  decentralization  efforts.  However,  as  highlighted  by  Devereux 
(1996), Johnson (1997), Moore and Putzel (1999) Leach et al., (1999) Luckham 
et al. (1999) and many others, customary authorities are rarely democratic. They 
often inherit their positions, and their degree of local accountability depends on 
their personalities and local social and political histories. Furthermore, customary 
authorities are notorious for entrenched gender inequalities and for favoring 
divisive, ethnic-based membership (Zufferey 1986; Colchester 1994; Baland and 2 PArt	II	|	Changes	in	governance
Platteau 1996; Pretty and Ward 2001). In those circumstances it is not surprising 
that both ‘grey’ and published literatures provide many examples on how local 
elite groups have captured the benefits of decentralization projects for their own 
use, thus reducing considerably the potential positive effect of the reforms for the 
rest of the local population  (Moore and Putzel 1999; Dreze and Sen 1995; 
Abraham and Platteau 2000; Crook and Sverrisson 2001). 
The issue of lack of representativeness of  
decentralized bodies 
Customary authorities are not the only possible recipients of newly devolved 
power; other groups in the local arena are often empowered in decentralization 
reforms. These include local councils, membership organizations, single-purpose 
committees  and  other  user  groups.  These  organizations,  which  are  often 
empowered as if they were representative, are not always democratically elected. 
Willmann  (1993)  notes,  for  instance,  that,  in  general,  the  representatives  on 
councils, committees, and associations are usually not elected by a formal voting 
process but become members due to their social, economic, and lineage position 
in the community, clan or tribe. This was clearly the case in the South Indian 
villages studied by Wade (1988), where local councils were typically controlled 
by members from the dominant castes and by wealthier landowners. In some 
other cases, even locally elected bodies may not be representative of society as a 
whole, in particular with respect to gender. With the exception of Uganda and 
South Africa, women generally remain excluded from these local bodies in most 
parts of Africa. The Ghanaian District Assemblies (DAs) provide a vivid illustration 
of this type of exclusion (see Box 8). 
Ghana’s District Assemblies (DAs) were created initially to enhance electoral participation and 
access and representation of groups normally excluded, such as the non-educated, farmers, 
traders and artisans. Experience shows, however, that the social composition of the elected DAs 
remains distinctly dualist, even after several years, with predictable over-representation of the 
well educated – but with increasing representation of less privileged groups. For instance, % 
of all elected members in the first election in 1989 were teachers or civil servants, and in the poor 
Northern District studied by Crook and Manor it was 7% in 1992-9 (Crook and Manor 1998). In 
spite of the positive effects on public participation that the DAs have achieved since their creation, 
their responsiveness to popular needs, particularly to the most underprivileged in rural areas, has 
not been good. In the two districts surveyed in 1992 by Crook and Manor, 70% of respondents felt 
that DAs did not respond to their needs, and only 22% felt it was better than the previous non-
elected system. Similar results were recorded even after extra resources were allocated to the 
DAs through the DA Common Funds in 199 (Ayee 1996). As Crook concludes: “the Ghana case 
is particularly interesting as it illustrates clearly the proposition that ‘participation is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for greater responsiveness’” (Crook 2002, p.). With respect to gender 
issue, Crook notes that only 1.6% of members of the first assemblies were women.
Box 8: Lack of responsiveness of local bodies: The case of the District Assemblies in Ghana
Source: Shackleton and Campbell (2001)2  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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NGOs and decentralization
Grassroots groups and NGOs are usually expected to play a major role in rural 
development and in decentralization and governance reforms, acting as facilitators, 
power-brokers or mediators between communities and government agencies, or 
among communities and other actors (e.g. the private sector). In many cases, their 
influence and impact have been positive, or even crucial. However, their role needs 
to be examined critically. Fisher (1997) argues that the NGO field is a “heterogeneous 
one  encompassing  a  wide  range  of  groups  with  different  ideological  agendas” 
(Fisher 1997, p.458). In particular it should be borne in mind that many international 
NGOs, and the national or local counterpart they are supporting, are “inspired by a 
particular vision of the society they wish to develop” (Tandon 1994, p.53). These 
values  differ  –  they  may  see  themselves  ‘humanizing’  structural  adjustment  or 
privatization, helping constituents adjust to top-down development projects, or 
inducing changes in social and economic orders – but they are not value-neutral; 
their primary motivations are beliefs about what is right and wrong. Although 
NGOs may present ethical judgments as neutral standards of values that stand 
outside political contest, these judgments are essentially political. Perhaps, more 
importantly with respect to the issue of decentralization and governance reforms, 
these organizations may also not be accountable to, or representative of, local 
people in a systematic manner. Transferring powers to these organizations cannot 
be considered more democratic or representative than privatization. The development 
literature provides examples of cases where membership organizations have failed 
to sustain their development efforts, or have benefited only a privileged minority 
(Cousins 1993; Mearns 1996; Botchway 2001; Toulmin and Cotula 2003). 
Mechanisms toward better governance
So far, the discussion has focused on governance reform, and in particular on 
decentralization as one way to improve governance. Reforms, however, are not 
the only road to change. Even if the governance system remains unchanged, 
mechanisms  can  be  created  that  may  help  to  improve  the  overall  quality  of 
governance.  Participation  has  been  recognized  as  one  such  mechanism, 
accountability as another. These two concepts are reviewed below. Here again, 
lessons can be learned and questions asked from a fisheries governance perspective. 
Some of the issues and concepts discussed here will be of direct relevance in Part 
III, which reviews co-management experiences in fisheries. 
Participation
 
Participation and the associated concept of “empowerment” lie at the centre of 
contemporary  discourses  on  development.  No  longer  limited  to  government 
reforms,  participation  has  become  a  key  element  in  the  rhetoric  concerning 2 PArt	II	|	Changes	in	governance
almost every major issue (development, environmental conservation, etc). Today, 
the concept has taken on the characteristics of a panacea; academic studies, policy 
statements,  NGOs  or  international  organization  recommendations  etc.  that 
promote the benefits of (good) governance, make “participation” one, if not the 
core element of development. In fact, as pointed out by Michener, it seems that 
nowadays “No respectable project can not use this word, nor can get funded 
without some reference to this concept” (Michener, 1998, p.2105).
It  appears  that  the  strong  support  which  has  been  given  to  ‘participatory 
approaches’ stems from the same paradigmatic shift that supported the governance 
shift. Traditional ‘top-down’ management systems were perceived as inducing 
inertia, rent-seeking behavior and corruption; and private markets supporting 
unequal asset distribution and monopoly power were recognized as exposing the 
poor  to  exploitative  processes,  low  wage  jobs  or  marginal  forms  of  self-
employment. In this context, participatory projects and methods were presented 
as a possible response to these problems. Indeed, where some stringent conditions 
are met, there is evidence that participatory approaches can help to reduce poverty 
and exclusion, by giving local communities direct control over some services and 
resources, and allowing them to exercise more influence over decision-making 
processes. For instance, Ostrom’s study of common-pool resource management 
demonstrated that user groups “can organize themselves voluntarily to retain the 
residuals of their own efforts” in order to manage collective water sources, fisheries, 
and forests, thus producing more efficient and equitable results than either the 
state or market system (Ostrom 1990, p.25). 
The positive influence of participation was also confirmed by the World Bank 
through its water management study which found that participation in water 
management was crucial to “overall project effectiveness” and to “individual and 
community empowerment” (Narayan 1994, p.viii). Strong evidence also supports 
the efficacy of participatory research and action programmes designed to involve 
potential  users  in  decision-making,  monitoring  and  evaluation  processes. 
According to Chambers (1995), these activities have shown that local people do 
understand the social and political conditions under which they live, and possess 
relevant  technical  knowledge  for  the  solution  of  many  local  problems;  that 
involving  them  in  project  development  allows  agencies  to  acquire  better 
understanding of local needs than do traditional surveys; and that these methods 
can reduce dependence on outside experts and empower local people.
Typology of participation
Definitions of participation differ, and this affects the way observers perceive the 
benefits  of  a  participatory  approach.  Michener  (1998)  classifies  participatory 
approaches according to the nature of these benefits. Her classifications range 26  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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from  planner-centered  to  people-centered  approaches.  A  planner-centered 
participatory approach focuses on administrative and financial efficiency. From 
this  perspective,  the  motivation  for  popular  participation  is  that  beneficiary 
involvement makes projects more likely to succeed in meeting their objectives: if 
local people participate actively in project planning and implementation, they 
are more committed to its success. Participation increases local people’s acceptance 
of new policies and technologies promoted by outsiders. Through beneficiary 
participation, indigenous knowledge can be tapped and local labor, and financial 
and in-kind contributions can lower the implementation costs. 
By contrast, the people-centered approach is the perception that participation is 
both a means and an end in itself. It is a means to meet locally felt needs and re-
distribute  scarce  resources,  but  also  has  an  inherent  value  as  a  process  that 
empowers  the  poor  by  enhancing  local  management  capacity,  increasing 
confidence in indigenous potential, and raising collective consciousness. It is 
close  to  the  concept  of  ‘deep’  participation  initially  promoted  by  Chambers 
(1983) and others, where greater participation is seen as way to foster emancipation, 
and to empower the deprived and the excluded “to do their own analysis, to take 
command, to gain in confidence and to take their own decisions” (Chambers 
1995, p.30).
Cohen and Uphoff’s (1980) typology (Table 1) has an applied focus and includes 
not only different types of participation but also ‘who’ participates and ‘how’. 
These authors suggest organizing the typology of participation according to the 
phases in the project cycle (evaluation, benefits, implementation and decision-
making), although the phases are not necessarily sequential. The ‘who’ dimension 
divides  the  actors  involved  into  local  residents,  local  leaders,  government 
personnel,  and  foreign  personnel.  The  ‘how’  dimension  describes  various 
mechanisms by which participation can take place, its form, extent and impact.












Table 1. Cohen and Uphoff’s (1980) classification of participation27 PArt	II	|	Changes	in	governance
Several other classifications of participation have been developed, many of which 
focus on the balance of decision-making power exercised by managers or planners, 
as opposed to users of a service. Deshler and Sock’s (1985) typology, for instance, 
distinguishes different levels of participation based on the extent of control or 
power. The scale ranges from pseudo-participation (or the “manipulation of the 
beneficiaries by development professionals to meet the needs of the elites”) to 
genuine participation, in which participants are empowered by having control 
over program policy and management. 
Many of these classification systems underline the importance of the relative power 
of outsiders versus beneficiaries as a key characteristic in defining participation. The 
analysis of these classifications suggests that the critical issue here is the distinction 
between strong and weak participation processes, based on the degree of control 
that users can exercise over agencies. Weak participation involves ‘consulting or 
informing’ the users, while strong participation means ‘partnership with, or ceding 
control to’ them. This weak/strong participation gradient is in fact close to the World 
Bank’s 1992 continuum, which ranged from ‘information sharing’ with beneficiaries, 
through ‘consultation’ and ‘decision-making’ to ‘initiating action’ (Table 2). 
Weak versus strong participation: Which one is best?
In practice, all interventions operate along the continuum that stretches from 
weak  to  strong,  and  all  participatory  approaches  are  driven  by  the  best  of 
intentions. This has led to welcome efforts to adapt projects to local needs, and 
Information-sharing. Designers and managers of World Bank-supported operations may share 
information with beneficiaries in order to facilitate collective or individual action. Information-
sharing is a form of low-level participation, but it can have a positive impact on project 
outcomes to the extent that it equips people to understand and perform their tasks better.
Consultation.  When people are not only informed but also consulted on key issues, the 
level of intensity of popular participation increases. There is an opportunity here for people, 
especially disadvantaged people, to interact and provide feedback to the development 
agency.  Through  this  feedback  the  agency  can  take  into  account  both  upstream  and 
downstream issues in the design and implementation stages.
Decision-making. A still higher level of participation intensity may be said to occur when 
people, notably disadvantaged people, have a decision-making role in matters of policy, 
project design and implementation. Decisions may be made exclusively by disadvantaged 
people or jointly with others on specific issues or aspects relating to a policy or project.
Initiating  action.  When  people,  especially  disadvantaged  people,  are  able  to  take  the 
initiative in terms of actions and decisions pertaining to a World Bank-supported operation, 
the intensity of popular participation may be said to have reached its peak. Initiative implies 
a proactive capacity and the confidence to get going on one’s own. This is qualitatively 
different from the capacity to act or decide on issues or tasks proposed or assigned to people 
by some external development agency.
Table 2. The World Bank’s four levels of intensity in popular participation
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has generated useful new methods (see for instance Chambers 1995; World Bank 
1996). However, recent research suggests that advocates of both approaches are 
confronting many serious problems in practice.
Problems with ‘strong’ participation
Brett (2000) suggests that strong participation can only be used for a limited 
range of activities, and is only likely to succeed where a wide range of demanding 
organizational and social conditions are met. 
Managing  large  systems  –  problems  of  hierarchy  and  complexity.  The  participatory 
movement is primarily concerned with micro- or small-scale development projects 
for the rural and urban poor. These projects focus on local communities and on the 
management of local projects, such as school and road construction or maintenance, 
health centers, extension agencies, water and sanitation. However, there are also a 
wide range of critically important large-scale projects and programmes on which 
everybody depends – major roads, tertiary education, national and global research 
and development programmes, and the whole range of essential goods and services 
provided by national and global companies. These require complex technology and 
decisions taken at national and, increasingly, at global levels. Here hierarchy, expertise 
and professional autonomy in governance and project management are essential, and 
‘real’ participation, involving direct control by local people, is virtually impossible.  
Because he believes that strong participatory processes will never displace the 
need for hierarchical public and private bureaucracies, market competition and 
representative democracy, Brett states that direct control by the beneficiaries over 
the way decisions are made and implemented is severely constrained. “Those 
who claim that these participatory methodologies can fundamentally alter the 
nature of the power structure that sustains complex societies are simply ignoring 
the well-established insights of modern social science” (Brett 2000, p.10). Drawing 
upon Weber (1968), Brett notes that control over complex systems is “possible 
only to a very limited degree by persons who are not technical specialists”, while 
the technical superiority of hierarchical systems over other forms of organization 
means that they will eventually become the only organizational systems able to 
effectively control these complex systems. 
Brett further points out that the majority of large public and private donors are 
actually good examples of this managerial principle. Although they are actively 
promoting the participatory ideal, they do not apply the principle to their own 
activities,  but  operate  on  classical  Weberian  lines  and  generally  adopt  weak 
participatory operational mechanisms (Box 9). Theorists of the firm agree that 
hierarchy is “ubiquitous within all organizations of any size” (Williamson 1985, 
p.269). All modern democracies have had to shift direct control from citizens to 29 PArt	II	|	Changes	in	governance
their representatives, since (as it was initially suggested by Hegel 1964) every free 
individual cannot be given a share in debating and deciding political affairs. 
Ironically, this issue is simply the re-surfacing of the very old debate between the 
first two main democratic systems: the Ancient Greek Democracy and the Ancient 
Roman Republic, translated into the issue of development project governance. 
In  addition  to  this  operational/managerial  constraint  (where  organisational 
imperatives force large agencies to use methods that offer users little more than a 
consultative role), a ‘conceptual’ constraint also needs to be recognised: Efficiency 
in governance may require some degree of autonomy. As pointed out by Olson 
(1997), strong participatory supporters often make unrealistic assumptions about 
the ability of the poor to access decision-making processes. Democratic processes 
can be subverted by small groups whose interests do not coincide with those of 
society as a whole. “The poor and unemployed are almost never organized for 
collective action”, so “some civil society democracy programmes ... more often 
retard than advance the economic and democratic development of the recipient 
countries” (Olson 1997, p.60-61). In fact, rapid economic development has rarely 
been associated with participatory organization (Brett ibid, p.11). The success of 
the  East  Asian  economies,  for  example,  is  widely  attributed  to  ‘embedded 
autonomy’ – the ability to shelter officials from pressures from social groups with 
vested interests, which might undermine rational economic decisions (Leftwich 
1994; Putzel 1997). Indeed, while governments need to be responsive to pressure 
from ‘below’, they also need to be able to impose unpopular decisions on powerful 
social groups; this would be difficult if the latter were exercising direct control 
through strong participatory processes. These arguments do not deny the need to 
consult users and consumers. However, they do force us to moderate some of the 
more extreme claims being put forward by the proponents of participation, and 
to recognize that the problem of creating accountability is far more complex than 
many participatory theorists may assume or claim.
Box 9: The limits of strong participation in project implementation
Oakley (199) remarks that many implementing agencies attempt to justify their programmes by 
claiming that they are based on mechanisms that offer users significant participation. However, 
the scale and hierarchical nature of their organizational systems often oblige them to use weak 
participation, which only involves the need to inform and consult users to improve project 
design and management (Oakley 199, p.2). However, they believe that even weak participation 
will generate many advantages. These include better information about local needs, capacities, 
and the impact of programmes, ways of adapting programmes to local conditions, delivering 
demand-responsive services, mobilizing local resources, improving utilization and maintenance 
of state facilities, and ways of increasing public recognition of governmental achievements and 
legitimacy.  By contrast, they also recognize that such programmes can incur high transaction 
costs, raise excessive expectations, substitute inappropriate local for technical knowledge, and 
allow local elites to capture development resources (World Bank 1992, p.1).0  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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Managing small-scale systems – problems of heterogeneity, coordination and conflicts. 
Small-scale  systems  are  not  exempt  from  the  problems  related  to  ‘strong’ 
participation. The literature is full of examples which, despite their relatively 
small  scale  (pilot  projects,  micro-projects,  community/village  projects),  have 
encountered  major  problems  related  to  issues  of  self-interest,  coordination, 
community heterogeneity and conflicts of interest (Box 10). Furthermore, the 
implementation of ‘strong’ participation assumes or requires a certain number of 
conditions to be present. As clearly demonstrated by Putnam (1993), Fukuyama 
(1995), or Putzel (1997), the capacity to cooperate depends on the level of ‘social 
capital’, and this is both unevenly distributed and the product of long historical 
processes and entrenched cultural values. Only where this social capital exists are 
cooperative projects likely to succeed. This is most likely to be the case where 
better-educated and privileged groups and social strata are involved. Additionally, 
participation can be costly and socially disruptive for those involved. Meetings 
take an immense amount of time and discussions can generate conflicts, so users 
may well prefer to “hand over their participatory rights to professionals – thereby 
saving themselves time, energy and, in some instances, conflicts”, as demonstrated 
by Eyben and Ladbury (1995, p. 197) in relation to a family planning project in 
Nepal.  Such  conflicts  are  probably  inevitable,  since  participatory  systems  are 
rarely a response to demand from local people, who may well be locked into 
hierarchical  and  deferential  structures,  but,  rather,  promoted  in  response  to 
western values imported by donors (Sachs 1992; Crush 1995; Escobar 1995). 
This obliges local communities to develop different kinds of organizations from 
those they have used in the past, thus demanding new skills and the ability to 
overcome local opposition if they are to succeed. 
Despite  their  small  scale,  pilot  projects,  micro-projects,  or  community/village  projects,  can 
encounter  major  problems.  Martinez’s  work  (1998)  in  a  poor  indigenous  community  in 
Mexico shows that most of the local projects demonstrating a high level of solidarity were 
undermined by problems created by unequal and inadequate access to information, free-riding 
and inappropriate incentives. Another example is Nicholls’ review of participatory UNDP and 
ActionAid projects in Uganda, which shows that some of the projects had been undermined by 
“the tension and mistrust resulting from the beneficiary community’s social heterogeneity and 
internal inequality [which] manifested themselves in the form of unaccountable, autocratic, or 
corrupt leadership by group leaders known to be taking advantage of group members” (Nicholls, 
1998, p.21-22). Michener’s study of a Save the Children Fund education programme in Burkina 
Faso identifies the “conflicting uses of ‘participation’ by different stakeholders taking part in the 
same project” , the way they all attempted to exploit the situation for their own gain, and concluded 
that neither the agency officials, nor the teachers nor the beneficiaries were “fully engaged in 
genuine transformative participation” (1998, p.210 and 211). Mayoux showed that these kinds 
of problems are also relevant to the involvement of women in participatory processes and that 
“women themselves are frequently less enthusiastic about participating in many participatory 
development projects” (Mayoux 199, p.21).
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Finally,  strong  participation,  especially  in  the  domain  of  natural  resource 
management, requires that in addition to power and influence the community 
has the skills and knowledge to manage the resource. In reality however, as noticed 
by  Baland  and  Platteau  (1996,  p.384),  “one  needs  to  call  into  question  the 
romantic view according to which such groups are perfectly informed about the 
resource simply because of proximity”. Imperfection, in terms of understanding 
and information about the state of the resource and the link between current 
states and the level of the stock, may lead to irreversible and serious mismanagement 
decisions. As a result, it cannot automatically be inferred that communities are 
able to devise rules for resource management/protection. “As a matter of fact, it 
appears that, in many instances, the direct resource-users (like the centralized 
authorities) are not fully aware of the complexity of the ecological processes at 
work, or at least they tend to underestimate the long-term negative effects of their 
present use on the future state of the resource” (ibid, p.384).
In  effect,  inland  fisheries  can  easily  be  used  to  illustrate  the  difficulties  of 
implementing strong participation approaches in the case of NRM, irrespective of 
the size of the system considered (small-scale or larger scale fisheries). First, the 
existence  of  dams  or  similar  flow-control  structures  such  as  dike,  irrigation 
reservoir or weir can be seen as external ‘disturbances’ that impact the fisheries 
system  (resource  and  resource-users)  from  outside,  being  therefore  generally 
totally out of control of the resource end-users or resource managers’ decisions. 
In  those  cases,  even  if  the  fisheries  management  responsibilities  have  been 
effectively  devolved  to  the  local  stakeholders  through  an  appropriate  and 
transparent process resulting in strong participation, whichever entity is in charge 
of that management may still not be able to make the adequate decisions or 
implement the adequate planning due to the unpredictable and/or often unwanted 
effects of those dams or reservoirs built a hundred kilometers upstream. Second, 
the existence of trans-boundary stocks; very few fisheries rely exclusively on ‘local’ 
species whose entire reproductive cycle takes place within the ‘administrative’ 
boundaries of the (decentralized) fisheries. Many fish species move up and down 
along the river during their life, making therefore the management of those stocks 
a problem which can not be reasonably handled exclusively at the local district, 
or even regional level, disregarding the quality of the decentralization process or 
the level of participation of the stakeholders in the management process.   
Problems with ‘weak’ participation
Projects  with  weak  participation  have  been  criticized  for  their  lack  of  ‘true 
participation’. In theory, such projects could still empower local people and, at 
the same time, allow specific agencies to operate efficient bureaucratic systems. In 
practice, however, these systems have serious limits, as they do not transfer real 
power, have limited accountability mechanisms, and can sometimes be used to 2  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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hide poor performance or transfer costs and responsibilities from the users. The 
fundamental flaw, however, of weak participation is that the right to be consulted 
does not imply a right to determine outcomes, which continues to depend on the 
goodwill and competence of the relevant agency. The case of the NORRIP8  project 
in Ghana for instance, is a good illustration of this flaw. In this project, Botchway 
shows how the concept of participation was only managerial and technocratic in 
essence, thus greatly limiting the villagers’ participation. As a consequence, the 
project did not allow the villagers to prioritize their own needs. The villagers’ 
participation was instead embedded in a programme initiated from outside. In 
particular, the project was not linked to a serious systematic effort to enhance the 
economic  and  self-financing  capabilities  of  communities.  Consequently,  the 
villages  did  not  acquire  a  stronger  position  from  which  to  generate  revenue 
through  a  re-organization  of  their  socio-economic  environment.  Instead,  the 
communities entered into a new form of dependency, one in which they had to 
depend on outside forces for assistance in maintaining hand pumps.
The NORRIP project illustrates that consultation can only be as effective as the 
agencies allow it to be, thus leaving control firmly in their hands. Potentially, this 
means  subverting  one  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  organizational 
accountability. Such problems can only be avoided by finding effective ways of 
balancing  the  need  for  bottom-up  control  with  top-down  authority,  which 
suggests  that  weak  participatory  processes  need  to  be  combined  with  strong 
organizational  accountability.  In  other  words,  the  flaw  of  weak  participative 
governance is not the low level of participation per se, but rather the fact that this 
may be combined with a lack of downward accountability.
Downward accountability
Accountability is usually presented as one of the three pillars of good governance. 
However, in contrast to the other two – participation and transparency - which 
are prominently discussed in the literature, accountability is rarely discussed 
beyond the allusion to its contribution to good governance. One possible reason 
for this is that accountability is a technical concept —or perceived as such— not 
always well-defined or explained in the literature. As a result, accountability does 
not  receive  the  attention  and  recognition  that  its  critical  role  in  governance 
would warrant. 
8  The  long-term  objective  of  the  Northern  Region  Rural  Integrated  Project  (NORRIP)  funded  by  the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Ghanaian government, was to increase the 
capacity for self-initiated and sustainable social and economic improvement in Northern Ghana through the 
completion of a series of different development projects, in particular the Integrated Village Water Projects 
(IVWP). The objective of the IVWP was to provide water supply units (hand-pump fitted boreholes) to the 
local communities in targeted areas. PArt	II	|	Changes	in	governance
Accountability  is  usually  understood  (in  principal-agent  theory)  as  “the 
requirement for one party (the agent) to give an account of his action to another 
party (the principal)” (Power 1997, p.5). This is usually explicitly or implicitly 
referred  to  as  upward  accountability.  Accountability  –  and  in  particular 
accountability of the State (the ‘Executive’) – has recently attracted a great deal of 
attention, especially by the World Bank, which has developed a framework based 
on this concept to address issues of public accountability and corruption (World 
Bank 2000). In the context of governance, however, experience suggests that the 
key concept is downward accountability to the users. Downward accountability 
can  be  defined  as  the  institutional  mechanisms  or  processes  through  which 
executing agents or decision-makers are liable to be called to account by their 
beneficiaries or consumers. 
Downward  accountability  can  be  created  in  many  different  ways.  The  most 
common one is election. Election of local representatives in particular is viewed 
as  a  critical  mechanism  for  increasing  downward  accountability  of  local 
representative actors. Other mechanisms include procedures for recall; referenda; 
legal  recourse  through  courts;  third  party  monitoring  by  media,  NGOs  or 
independently elected controllers. In addition, auditing and evaluation; political 
pressure and lobbying by associations and associative movements; provision of 
information on the role and obligations of elected representatives; and public 
reporting requirements can be very effective mechanisms to ensure and improve 
downward accountability. Finally education; embedment of the leaders into their 
community; performance awards; widespread participation in election; and social 
movements are other important ways to reinforce accountability. 
Drawing upon four case studies of decentralization from South Asia (India and 
Nepal) and West Africa (Senegal and Mali), Agrawal and Ribot demonstrate 
how downward accountability is a crucial element in decentralization processes. 
They remark:
“if powers are decentralized to actors who are not accountable to their constituents, 
or  who  are  accountable  only  to  themselves  or  superior  authorities  within  the 
structure  of  government,  then  decentralization  is  not  likely  to  accomplish  its 
stated  aims.  It  is  only  when  constituents  come  to  exercise  accountability  as  a 
countervailing power that decentralization is likely to be effective”. (1999, p.477) 
The important point to note, however, about downward accountability is that, 
although it “goes far beyond the normative demands of weak participation by 
demanding institutions to give users real control over the agencies that provide 
their services”, this control is “not necessary direct” (Brett 2000, p.17 -our emphasis). 
In other words, downward accountbility does imply some sort of participation, 
but not necessarily one involving direct control or even consultation. This reflects 
the  fact  that  there  is  no  strong  correlation  between  the  form  (or  degree)  of   WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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participation,  and  accountability.  As  long  as  the  members  of  an  agency  or 
committee  are  accountable  to  the  beneficiaries  or  users  of  the  project,  the 
empowerment of these users may be achieved without some of the pitfalls induced 
by a strong participatory arrangement. 
Unfortunately, excessive focus on direct control mechanisms (such as participation) 
to achieve accountability is frequent. In the past this excessive attention on direct 
controls and consultation has seriously distorted the understanding of the cause 
of development failure and the search for possible solutions. As emphasized by 
Brett (ibid, p.17) “The development of comprehensive welfare systems, strong 
environmental controls, and effective regulation of corporate giants is impossible 
without representative [but not necessarily direct] democracy and a strong state. 
[Likewise] real leverage over the performance of private firms is much better 
provided  through  market  competition  than  through  direct  controls  by,  or 
consultations with, users”. This view challenges some of the claims made by the 
proponents of participatory theory, who seem to assume that participation is the 
only, and even the best, method of achieving empowerment and emancipation. 
In fact, participatory approaches can fail, just like state or market systems, if they 
are not subjected to strong accountability. 
Some concluding remarks about participation and 
accountability
Building on Botchway (2001), Brett (2000) and others, we recognize that, because 
of the assumed “inherent goodness of the notion of participation”, this concept 
is often presented as a substitute for the true structural reforms needed for social 
or economic changes. One of the main issues related to the over-enthusiasm 
associated  with  the  concept  of  participation  is  that  it  tends  to  become  self-
justifying: if a participatory project fails, it must be because it was not participatory 
enough.  But  is  maximum  participation  the  ultimate  goal  and  the  ‘solution’? 
Perceptively foreshadowing more recent experiences, Esman and Uphoff argued 
some twenty years ago: 
“The aims of membership participation need to be realistic … there are many different 
kinds of participation, not all of them relevant or effective for all tasks. It makes no 
sense to think in terms of achieving maximum participation, since participating in 
decision-making or implementation, for example entails costs as well as benefits to 
individuals” (1982, p.82).
In the light of the experiences in the more recent literature, it seems indeed that 
in many development projects the justification for participatory programmes 
has been relatively narrow and ignored many of the contextual issues that remain 
out of the control or influence of the beneficiaries of development projects. The 
main lesson is that participation should not be treated as a new and/or all- PArt	II	|	Changes	in	governance
powerful ‘panacea’ but more pragmatically as one element in a wider approach 
to  development  management  where  the  need  for  hierarchy,  expertise  and 
discipline in service delivery systems, as well as ‘bottom-up’ controls is also 
recognised and included.
What can be learned from this review is that the key factor affecting the performance 
of governance arrangements is not the degree of participation per se, but the nature 
of  the  institutional  constraints  that  determine  how  much  leverage  users  can 
exercise over relevant agencies, and whether these operate in the state, market or 
voluntary sector. Leverage does not imply direct control, but does require far more 
than a willingness to consult. Consultation is beneficial, but users’ interests will 
only be fully respected where agencies are answerable to them. This means that 
participatory theory must be located within a broader approach that sees strong 
accountability as the critical variable in social empowerment and emancipation. 
In the words of Agrawal and Ribot (1999, p.478): 
“…downward accountability of those who receive powers from the central state on 
the behalf of a constituency is the primary dimension of decentralization since it can 
broaden the participation of local populations and enhance the responsiveness of the 
empowered actors” (our emphasis). 
In  conclusion,  participatory  processes  can  unquestionably  play  a  key  role  in 
strengthening  governance  in  certain  kinds  of  decentralization  projects  and 
programmes.  However,  as  the  discussion  above  clearly  demonstrated,  these 
participatory processes will only be effective where state agencies are well-managed 
by professional public servants who have appropriate incentives, are allowed to 
exercise professional autonomy, and who have adequate authority to perform 
their roles. Furthermore – and perhaps more importantly – participatory processes 
and decentralization reforms will not provide end-users with reliable, high-quality 
and  cost-effective  services  unless  the  end-users  can  exercise  effective  leverage 
through  strong  democratic  institutions,  market  competition,  civil  society 
organizations, and above all, downward accountability mechanisms. 6  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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Part III - Governance reforms in fisheries:  
The co-management experience
Concepts and theoretical framework
The governance reforms and decentralization programmes that have been widely 
promoted and adopted in developing countries since the 1990s have also involved 
natural resources, including fisheries. Governance reforms in fisheries, however, did 
not simply reflect or mimic the shift in governance paradigm that has occurred in 
other sectors. As will be demonstrated in the first section below, governance reforms 
in fisheries have in effect resulted mainly from an internal ‘maturation’ process that 
has evolved independently from the influence or the arguments put forward by the 
two  main  schools-of-thought  promoting  decentralization.9  Of  course,  fisheries 
scholars have not been insensitive to, or uninfluenced by, the wider debate, and 
terms such as ‘governance’ are now widely used in fisheries science. But the use of 
this jargon occurred relatively late, in the mid-1990s; the main arguments for reform 
in fisheries had been conceptualized and articulated much earlier – through, for 
instance, the work of Pinkerton (1989), Berkes (1989) or Pomeroy (1991). 
Although fisheries possess some characteristics common to other sectors, which 
makes some of the analytical frameworks and research carried out in these other 
sectors very useful in understanding the challenges of governance changes in 
fisheries, fisheries also have some specific characteristics that require particular 
attention. In particular, in many parts of the world (especially in Africa), the use 
of, and access to, aquatic resources have been tightly controlled and administered 
by  local  traditional  leaders  (chief  fisherman,  master  of  waters,  etc.),  whose 
authority has been institutionalized and enforced within the community through 
moral, political or religious norms and rules. In contrast to many other public 
service domains, such as health, education and infrastructure, where traditional 
structures  are  absent  or  very  limited  in  extent,  the  presence  of  these  pre-
decentralization local institutions poses conceptual and practical challenges.
Conceptual challenges arise from the fact that, as the analysis below will show, 
these  institutions  are  not  considered  in  the  classic  bipolar  model  of  ‘central 
government/civil society’ used to analyze and conceptualize participation and 
power devolution in fishery co-management reform. Practical challenges on the 
other hand arise because any decentralization of fisheries (especially of inland 
fisheries where the prevalence of these pre-decentralisation institutions is still 
9 Cf. section “Rationale for decentralisation” p.16.7 PArt	III	|	governance	reforms	in	fisheries:	the	co-management	experience
very important) will have to recognize these authorities and assess whether or not 
they are the ‘legitimate’ recipients of any newly devolved power.
Origins of ‘decentralization’ in fisheries
Although many developing countries’ fisheries are characterized by weak central 
management exercised by national government, and strong local institutions – 
and thereby provide perfect cases for the proponents of public choice theory (see 
p.16) – the consensus on decentralization reform in fisheries has been largely 
influenced by the ‘community paradigm’. 
In this paradigm, it is assumed that the existence of ‘pro-social norms’ (Bowles 
and  Gintis  1998)  shared  by  individuals  within  the  community  ensures  the 
‘superiority’ of local governance over other systems (see, for instance, Folke et al. 
1998).  In  particular,  it  is  asserted  that  local  governance,  through  the  ‘moral 
economy’ and social self-regulatory mechanisms, will guarantee the economic 
efficiency,  social  equitability  and  environmental  sustainability  of  the  system. 
Although these three aspects (efficiency, equitability, sustainability) are sometimes 
assumed to occur simultaneously,10   one central feature of this paradigm is the 
emphasis  put  on  the  capacity  of  the  community  to  use  and  care  for  (in  a 
‘sustainable’ way) the surrounding natural resources: 
“The value and wisdom of [community-based management] lies in its recognition 
that communities, by whatever definition we use, are potentially the best resource 
managers, since they have the biggest stake in the sustainability of natural resources” 
(Rivera and Newkirk 1997, p.74)
Under the community paradigm approach, the rationale for decentralization is 
therefore a pragmatic one; local people are more familiar with a given area than 
outsiders (including the staff of central agencies who are located in the often 
distant  capital  city);  local  community  have  a  broader  understanding  of  the 
environment and, in particular, of the specificities of the local ecosystems and 
natural resources they depend upon. Furthermore, it is frequently argued that 
local participation ensures self-interest, without which management efforts and 
investments are likely to fail.
One  of  the  inspirations  for  such  influence  has  been  the  ‘discovery’  by 
anthropologists and others, since the 1970s, of traditional systems of fisheries 
management practiced by local communities in Oceania (e.g. Johannes 1978), 
10 This is the so-called “three E’s” of community dynamics: Economy, Ecology and Equity. Poffenberger, 
for instance, states: “In many countries, community involvement is proving to be a cost-effective, socially 
just, and environmentally sound approach to stabilizing natural forests” (Poffenberger 1996, p.2). Likewise 
Demuynck (1994, p.3) asserts: “Community-based management aims at resource preservation or stock 
rehabilitation, effectiveness to build a socially and economically more viable fisheries and equity to generate 
equitable returns for all members of the fishing community”.8  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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Africa (e.g. Fay 1989; Harms 1989), Latin America (Forman 1967; Nietschmann 
1972), North America (Acheson 1975; Berkes 1977), as well in Japan (Comitini 
1966; Chang 1971; Ruddle 1989). By the beginning of the 1980s, statements 
regarding  the  desirability  of  reviving  or  adapting  traditional  community 
institutions of fisheries management to meet modern needs were being made in 
a  number  of  influential  papers  published  by  the  Food  and  Agriculture 
Organization  (Panayotou  1982;  Christy  1982),  the  World  Bank  (Emmerson 
1980) and the WorldFish Center – at that time called ICLARM International 
Centre for Living Aquatic Resource Management (Alexander 1980). Extended to 
an FAO study of riverine management systems (Scudder and Conelly 1985) and 
to a generalized examination of the role of fishermen’s organizations (Hannesson 
and Kurien 1988), such ideas had, by the early 1990s, become almost the received 
wisdom as far as the management of artisanal fisheries was concerned (e.g. World 
Bank 1993).
However, the theory that played a pivotal role in the shift of paradigm in fisheries 
sciences away from a centralized management system to community-based – and 
then co-management – approach is the theory of common property regimes 
(CPR). Although one primary impetus of the CPR analysts has been to denounce 
the conclusions promoted by Garrett Hardin in his article “The tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin 1968),11 their underlying intention was clearly to promote 
decentralization and local-level management reforms. For instance, Ostrom’s very 
influential  work  “Governing  the  commons,  the  evolution  of  institutions  for 
collective actions” (Ostrom 1990) has been in fact written in tandem with her 
participation  in  the  “Decentralization:  Finance  and  management  project” 
sponsored by the Office of Rural and Institutional Development of USAID.12 
Similarly, Berkes, in his introduction to the book “Common Property Resources” 
(Berkes 1989), leaves little doubt about the actual motives of his research: 
“The major area of emphasis here is on communal resource management systems. 
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ model overemphasizes the solutions of privatization 
and central administrative controls at the expense of local-level controls and self-
management. This book attempts to redress the balance, inviting resource managers 
and development planners to integrate local-level management (‘planning with the 
people’)  into  the  existing  common-property  resource-management  framework.” 
(Berkes 1989, p.2)
In addition to Berkes and Ostrom, many other scholars have been instrumental 
in the reorientation of the fisheries governance paradigm over the past 15 years 
(e.g. Jentoft, McKay, Pomeroy, Nielsen) and the policy consensus in favour of 
11 See, for instance, Berkes (1985); Berkes (1989); Feeny et al. (1990); Feeny (1994, pp.24-30); Feeny et al. 
(1996).
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fisheries decentralization – either under co-management or even community-
based natural resource management (CBRM) – has now been accepted in a large 
number of developed countries (e.g. Denmark, Netherlands, Canada), but also in 
an  increasing  number  of  developing  countries  in  Africa  (e.g.  Uganda,  Mali, 
Malawi,  Mozambique,  Senegal,  Ghana)  in  Southeast  Asia  (e.g.  Philippines, 
Malaysia), and in other parts of the world (e.g. the Fiji Islands) (Sen and Nielsen 
1996; Norman et al. 1998; Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 1998). 
Fisheries co-management
Co-management refers to decentralization reform. Although political sciences 
may not use this term – using instead terminologies such as ‘natural resource 
management  decentralization’  –  co-management  is  the  current  model  of 
decentralization applied in natural resource management, and in particular in 
forestry and fisheries.
Only one framework exists in fisheries literature to describe co-management. This 
framework (represented in Figure 1) has been initially proposed by McCay (1993) 
and  Berkes  (1994),  and  then  slightly  modified  in  Sen  and  Nielsen  (1996), 
Pomeroy  (1995,  2001),  Pomeroy  and  Berkes  (1997).  The  core  idea  of  this 
framework (hereafter referred to as the ‘McCay-Berkes’ framework in this report) 
is  that  co-management  is  characterized  by  various  partnership  arrangements 
distinguished from one another by the “degrees of power-sharing and integration 
of local and centralized management system” (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997, p.466). 
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of  co-management  arrangements  can  be  defined:  Instructive,  Consultative, 
Cooperative, Advisory, and Informative – to which the two classic types of 
management i.e. centralized and community self-management can be added. 
In its ‘extended’ version (e.g. Pomeroy 1995) the framework includes seven 
degrees  of  power-sharing,13  associated  with  seven  types  of  management 
arrangements (Table 3). 
The McCay-Berkes framework can be used to compare fisheries co-management 
arrangements and a large number of comparative analyses which were proposed 
in the literature have indeed used this framework for this purpose.14  However, 
the classification on which the framework is built is merely descriptive. It does not 
offer  any  analytical  ‘handles’  for  identifying  or  assessing  the  underlying 
mechanisms associated with the changes induced by co-management reforms. 
Consequently, using this framework for anything other than a descriptive purpose 
Type Description
Type A(+): Centralized management •  The state takes all decisions of policy and does not engage 
in dialogue with fisheries stakeholders. 
Type A: Instructive •  There is only minimal exchange of information between 
government and users. This type of co-management 
regime is only different from centralized management 
in the sense that the mechanisms exist for dialogue with 
users, but the process itself tends to be government 
informing users on the decisions which they plan to make. 
Type B: Consultative •  Mechanisms exist for governments to consult with users 
but all decisions are taken by government.
Type C: Cooperative •  This type of co-management is where government and 
users cooperate together as equal partners in decision-
making. For some authors this is the definition of co-
management
Type D: Advisory •  Users advise government of decisions to be taken and 
government endorses these decisions.
Type E: Informative •  Government has delegated authority to make decisions 
to user groups who are responsible for informing 
government of these decisions.
Type E(+): Self-governance and self-
management
•  Communities or other stakeholders take decisions 
about fisheries management and do consult or inform 
government or state laws. 
Table 3. Typology of fisheries management arrangements
Source: McCay (1993) and Berkes (1994) modified by Pomeroy (1995).
13 Note that Kesteven (1997), in his commentary on Sen and Nielsen’s 1996 article, remarks that the 
typology proposed in the framework is not based on different degrees of power-sharing as stated by its 
different ‘co-authors’, but based on the direction of information flow.
14 See, for instance, the many papers on fishery co-management in the Proceedings of the Bi-Annual 
Conferences of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, available on-line at http://
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may be misleading. In particular, because the core element which structures the 
framework is based on a gradient of power-sharing, using this framework as an 
‘explanatory tool’  leads to consider the degree of power devolved as the key 
(explanatory) factor and in particular to associate failure(s) of co-management 
with too little devolution/participation.
Review of the literature reveals that indeed, most co-management studies argue 
that there is generally not enough participation in fisheries reforms and that too 
little  responsibility  has  been  passed  down  to  the  community.  Pomeroy,  for 
instance,  asserts,  “The  devolution  of  fishery  management  authority  from  the 
central government to local level governments and organizations is an issue that 
is not easily resolved. .… Many attempts at decentralization have not delivered a 
real sharing of resource management power” (Pomeroy 2001, p.135). One reason 
for this perceived failure is that “Fisheries administrators may be reluctant to 
relinquish their authority, or portions of it, and governments are often opposed 
to decentralization” (Pomeroy 1993, p.14-15). Pomeroy is echoed by Sverdrup-
Jensen and Nielsen, who comment, “Under the present management arrangements 
situation [in Africa], user groups will often be patronized in possible disputes 
with  government.  The  latter  seems  generally  reluctant  to  devolve  power  and 
bestow  legal  rights  and  authority  in  fisheries  management  to  user  groups” 
(Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen 1998, p.11). This is also the opinion of Jul-Larsen 
and his co-authors (2003), who conclude, “Generally speaking, management of 
freshwater fisheries [in Southern Africa] is still very much in control of governments, 
and  the  negotiating  position  of  user  groups  versus  that  of  governments  is 
consequently comparatively low”. As Chirwa (1998, p.69) points out, “The FD’s 
[Fisheries  Department’s]  position  of  patronage  means  that  the  local  user 
communities  are  the  recipients  rather  than  the  initiators  of  decisions.  They, 
themselves,  are  managed,  together  with  their  resources,  by  the  Fisheries 
Department.” (quoted in Jul-Larsen et al. 2003, p.92). 
There is an interesting parallel to be made between the statement made by Deshler 
and Sock (1985) about pseudo-participation characterized as “the manipulation 
of the beneficiaries by development professionals” (see p.27 in section ‘Typology 
of  participation’  in  this  document)  and  that  by  Chirwa  above.  Using  the 
terminology  used  by  the  literature  on  participation,  this  suggests  that  co-
management in fisheries is often perceived as a ‘weak participation’ approach 
characterized by a relatively low level of devolution and responsibility sharing. 
This level of devolution is, however, only one dimension to consider within the 
process of participation per se. As emphasized by Cohen and Uphoff (1980), 
many  other  important  criteria  should  also  be  considered  when  evaluating  a 
project,  e.g.  the  kind  of  participation  (participation  in  decision-making;  in 
implementation; in benefits, in evaluation) or how the process occurs (the basis 2  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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of participation, its form, its extent, its effects) – see Table 1 above. In other words, 
assessing the participation process – and in the present case the fisheries co-
management  process  –  through  the  degree  of  participation  or  the  level  of 
devolution is not sufficient. 
Conceptually, the problem arises from the fact that, as noted above, the McCay-
Berkes framework attempts to characterize co-management mainly through the 
level of power devolution – i.e. the degree of stakeholder participation. In that 
case, the reference criterion is the gradient of power-sharing, running from one 
extremity (the central government) to the other (the community) –see Figure 1. 
This  mono-dimensional  conceptualization  of  the  process  reduces  governance 
reform to the degree of participation and does not necessary capture the main 
factor(s) explaining the degree of success or failure of decentralization reforms.
This point is confirmed by Neiland and Béné’s 2003 analysis. Throughout their 
review of 50 case studies of fisheries management arrangements from developing 
countries,  these  authors  found  no  tangible  correlation  between  the  level  of 
devolution  of  authority  and  the  degree  of  success  of  the  new  management 
arrangements.  Some  still  highly-centralized  fisheries  score  well  in  terms  of 
management  success,  while  some  highly  participatory  fisheries  display  lower 
scores –or vice versa (see their Appendix II for the detailed results). Instead, they 
identified a series of 10 explanatory factors covering a large range of issues related 
to governance and policy. Within these explanatory factors, ‘participation’ appears 
twice, once within the ‘policy’ sub-group and once within the ‘governance’ sub-
group. Their analysis therefore suggests that participation – in particular, the level 
of participation/devolution – is an important factor, but certainly not the only 
one explaining the success of co-management. Their analysis reveals eight others 
factors that may affect the fisheries management outcomes – and the list is not 
necessarily exhaustive. 
Focusing  on  the  level  of  participation  as  the  key  element  of  success  in  co-
management presents other problems. First, it tends to suggest that the stronger 
the participation, the more efficient and the more likely to succeed is the co-
management reform. However, as clearly demonstrated in the literature, ‘strong’ 
participation is not without its limitations and dangers, especially in the context 
of natural resource management (see pp.28-31 in this report). As Brett notes, 
“Maximum participation may not always be possible or efficient” (Brett 2000, 
p.1). In effect, as pointed out by Adams (1996b), and confirmed empirically by 
Neiland and Béné’s review, each fishery in each society has its own ‘balance point’ 
on the scale of management intervention. “Some fisheries are more effectively 
managed  by  governments  or  intergovernmental  bodies  and  some  are  more 
effectively  managed  by  local  communities  and  non-government  bodies,  with 
various mixtures in between” (Adams, 1996b, p.339). Thus, advocating for a  PArt	III	|	governance	reforms	in	fisheries:	the	co-management	experience
systematic ‘strong’ participation by the fishery community may not be the correct 
message to send to policy-makers. In other words, the issue of how much power is 
shared may be the wrong question. Instead issues of how this power is shared and 
through which accountability mechanisms may be more important.
Secondly, invoking the ‘too little power and weak participation’ factor to explain 
the failure of co-management places the main responsibility for the failure of 
reforms on government agencies (e.g. DoF) rather than on the community. Two 
comments  arise  from  this  last  point,  (i)  on  the  empirical  side,  the  literature 
provides some case studies that suggest that the community can also play an 
active  role  in  the  failure  of  co-management  reforms;  and  (ii)  on  the 
conceptualization side, there is an urgent need to go beyond the discourse on 
equity adopted by the co-management literature and propose analytical tools 
which enable assessment of the real impact of co-management reform on issues 
such as intra-community equity, access to the resource and poverty alleviation. 
Both comments relate to the ‘social’ dimension of co-management reforms, to 
which we now turn.  
Social impacts of co-management reforms
The empirical evidence
A significant number of reports and articles have been published on fisheries co-
management since the early 1990s. The majority of these studies are of a descriptive 
nature (Table 4), either reporting the legislative and managerial re-organization 
produced by the co-management reform – particularly the role of the state and/or 
the  (new)  managerial  responsibilities/tasks  of  fishermen’s  organizations  –  or 
discussing the issues of resource management and conservation and the (potential) 
role/capabilities of the communities. In contrast, very little has been done on 
assessing the effect of these reforms and in particular their poverty reduction and/
or  redistributive  impacts  beyond  the  implicit  assumption  that  devolution  of 
power empowers the local fishing communities. 
Yet  many  empirical  studies  suggest  that  co-management  reforms  do  not 
systematically  ensure  the  empowerment  of  local  communities  (as  initially 
expected) but instead lead either to the strengthening of the state’s control or, 
more frequently, to the reinforcement of the local elite’s control over resource 
policy, management, and allocation. For example, based on their study of the 
fishing communities of Cape Breton Island in Canada, Davis and Bailey (1996, 
p.254) showed how “one approach to co-management may have created and 
entrenched  an  economically  advantaged  and  empowered  fisher  elite”  to  the 
detriment of the rest of the community.   WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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While the number of peer-reviewed studies on these issues is limited, an abundant 
‘grey’ literature (internal reports, reports from NGOs or funding agencies) provides 
much evidence of the occurrence of these power issues, especially in developing 
countries. In Ghana, Mali and Niger, where decentralization is being implemented 
Breuil (2000), Kassibo (2000), Lenselink and Cacaud (2002) all question the 
appropriateness  and  accountability  of  the  new  institutional  arrangements.  In 
particular, they draw attention to the central role played by the traditional local 
institutions usually ‘crystallized’ around the authorities of the traditional local 
leaders, and question the real empowerment capacities of the decentralization 
reform. Central to the issue is the ‘re-appropriation’ of the newly devolved power 
by local leaders. In the case of the Malian decentralization in the High Diaka 
region, Kassibo (2000) reports:
“… the non-resident fishers have been excluded totally from the fisheries committees 
by the local fishers influenced by the traditional leaders. These traditional leaders 
… used the legitimate authority delegated [by the central government] through the 
decentralization process to appropriate all the top positions in these committees” 
(Kassibo 2000 p.86 – our translation).”
Kassibo’s  report  clearly  indicates  that  at  the  root  of  the  failure  of  this 
decentralization  is  a  lack  of  careful  consideration  of  power  relations  and  of 
personal  and/or  group  organization  within  the  communities  involved  in  the 
reform. In particular, the performances of the local indigenous institutions and 
the role of their traditional leaders as the ‘legitimized recipient’ of the newly 
devolved  power  have  not  been  carefully  evaluated.  For  other  parts  of  Africa 
(Southern region), Jul-Larsen and his co-authors (2003, p.91) admit: 
Main subject treated Share in the literature*
Stakeholder analysis (i.e. description of who are the (new) actors 
involved in the new management system) 
31.3 %
Natural resource management issues (i.e. co-management as a solution 
to improve the management of the stocks)
29.9 % 
Institutional and legislative issues (i.e. description of the role of the 
state as the provider of the new legislative framework supporting 
co-management, and the (new) managerial responsibilities/tasks 
of the fishers’ organizations/community)
27.8 %
General policy issues (i.e. co-management reform discussed from a 
broad fisheries policy perspective, usually with a chronological 
description of the changes/evolutions that have occurred in the 
fisheries policies at the national level)
9.7 %
Empowerment and equity issues (i.e. discussion or evaluation of the 
impacts of co-management in terms of benefits and power redis-
tribution; impacts on the poor)
1.4%
Table 4. Literature review on co-management in fisheries
* Based on 162 published articles. Source: Béné and Neiland (2004) PArt	III	|	governance	reforms	in	fisheries:	the	co-management	experience
“…the experiences of setting up co-management in the region have not been very 
encouraging up till now. Most arrangements have tended to exclude user groups from 
the  decision-making  process  and  from  influencing  who  should  participate  in  the 
making of operational rules for the fisheries.” 
A lack of conceptual research and base-line data
Despite these empirically-based conclusions, some other scholars continue to 
assert that “Co-management seeks equity in fisheries management. It seeks to 
empower the weak or less privileged groups in a community to allow them to 
freely participate in and collaborate on management” (Berkes et al. 2001, p.205) 
-see also Pomeroy (2001, p.118, p.121); Abdullah et al. (1998 p.40); Demuynck 
(1994, p.3). But the vagueness of the term “equity” highlights the weakness of 
the analysis. From the experience of other natural resource sectors, it is clear that 
links  between  the  state,  civil  society  and  the  poor  are  complex  and  vary 
considerably  in  terms  of  the  degree  of  access,  reciprocity,  exploitation  and 
marginalization both within communities and in community relations with the 
state and different parts of civil society. In particular, ‘equity’ is a complex concept 
that may have several interrelated components. When it is asserted that “co-
management leads to equity”, it may be necessary to scrutinize which dimension 
of equity is being considered. Is it ‘equity of access to the resource’ (endowment 
equity), or ‘equity in rent redistribution’ (economic equity), or ‘equity in the cost 
of management and transaction’ (institutional equity), or ‘equity of participation 
in the decision-making process’ (political equity or ‘empowerment’)? These are 
some of the questions that should be raised before asserting that “co-management 
leads to equity”. 
The only research project (to our knowledge) that has attempted to address these 
issues  comprehensively  and  rigorously  is  the  Community-Based  Fisheries 
Management (CBFM) program in Bangladesh (see next section). In this project, 
the research team considered two dimensions of equity – ‘empowerment’ and 
‘equity’ per se, and then used six different criteria to assess the changes in these 
two dimensions (Table 5). Using qualitative methods (cardinal ranking on a 10-
point scale) the project was able to monitor and quantify the impacts of the co-
management programme. The research team concluded “In general, significant 
changes  in  indicators  of  empowerment  (participation  and  influence)  and 
institutional efficiency (ease of decision-making) were reported in the beels15 … 
but the pattern of changes was less clear in the river…” (Thompson et al. 2000, 
p.11). To be able to reach these conclusions, however, the relevant dimensions of 
equity (or those expected/aspired to by the stakeholders) need to be identified, 
and ways to evaluate them established. This requires a ‘pre-project assessment’ 
that generates a baseline against which the changes in equity induced by the co-
15  Beels are depressions in the deeper parts of the floodplains.6  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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management  reform  can  be  compared.  Unfortunately,  very  few  studies  have 
undertaken these pre-project assessments, and their assertions that co-management 
improves ‘equity’ – however it is defined – lack hard data. 
Defining the “fishing community” in African inland fisheries
Running parallel to the issue of equity – or perhaps underlying it – is the other 
important question of the concept of ‘community’. With Agrawal and Gibson’s 
1999 literature review of the concept of ‘community’ in mind, it is necessary to 
raise the question of the meaning of this concept in the specific context of African 
inland fisheries. Allison and Ellis (2001) and Jul-Larsen and his co-authors (2003) 
drawing upon their experiences in Eastern and Southern Africa inland fisheries, 
point out that fisheries communities are much more complex socio-economic 
entities than are their land-based counter-parts, for two reasons. 
First, fishing is rarely the only activity in which households are engaged; instead 
fishing is usually part of a diversified matrix of activities. Fishing may also be 
undertaken by different members of the same household, at different times of the 
day or the year, and with different levels of subsistence or commercial intensity. 
Even in the case of lake fisheries where a great proportion of the community is 
expected to be full-time fishers - as compared to wetland or river fisheries – men 
are involved in many different activities over the course of the year. Under these 
circumstances, who should be considered as ‘the fishing community’? Jul Larsen 
et al. (2003, p.91) consider that this specific situation induces a fundamental 
problem that is rarely given full consideration in fisheries science: 
“Fishing  communities  are  considered  the  platform  to  ensure  local  participation. 
There are serious problems connected to this concept, since our study shows that 
“pure” fishing communities hardly exist along the lakes in Southern Africa. Most 
communities have a very diverse occupation structure, and fishing is only one among 
several occupations that provide the livelihood of the local people. In addition, many 
fishers have two homes – one on the lakeshore and another somewhere else. It is 
therefore almost impossible to create boundaries between fishers and non-fishers with 
regards to the representation of “the community” in co-management arrangements.” 
equity dimension Assessment criteria
Empowerment
•  Greater fisher participation in fishery management
•      Greater influence by stakeholder over decision
Equity
•  Representation of range of interest (stakeholders)
•  Process clarity – transparent management process
•  Homogeneous expectations among participants regarding 
management
•      Distributional equity: Benefits in proportion to costs, or seen as fair 
by community members
table	5.	CBFm	project’s	criteria	for	equity
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Secondly, in developing countries, especially in rural areas, fisheries often play a 
role of ‘safety net’ activity. People enter the fishery at certain periods of their life, 
as a result of particular circumstances (e.g. local or national economic crisis, 
natural  disaster,  conflict  or  war,  or  simply  because  of  individual  temporary 
vulnerability -when the household head losses his/her job for instance). A good 
example of this role of safety net is the case of the Lake Kariba fishery at the 
border between Zambia and Zimbabwe. Over the last 30 years, the Lake Kariba 
fishery has played this role twice. The first time was in the mid-1970s, when several 
thousand miners working in the copper belt in Zambia lost their jobs and migrated 
to the Lake region to engage in fishing. The second time was a few years later, 
during  the  Zimbabwean  Independence  War,  when  several  hundred  families 
moved to the Lake region for security and entered the fishery to ensure minimum 
incomes  until  the  political  situation  in  their  region  of  origin  had  improved   
(Jul-Larsen 2003).
In all these different cases, the fisheries provide an alternative activity that helps 
households maintain themselves above the poverty line – or at least to prevent 
them from falling too deeply into poverty – by providing income, employment 
and food. This role of poverty safety-net is usually temporary, and people then 
leave the sector when they are able to recover from the crisis and find again a new 
activity (or return to their initial one). In any case, this means that different parts 
of the ‘community’ may engage in fishing activities at different periods. Again, 
this raises the question of ‘who is the fishing community?’ As argued by Jul-Larsen 
et al. (2003, p.92): 
“This complicates a management system based entirely on the voice of the (existing) 
fishing communities because it will not reflect the concern of keeping the fisheries 
as safety valves in people’s strategies toward changing (and until now deteriorating) 
macro-economic  conditions.  If  co-management  primarily  becomes  a  tool  for 
allocation of access rights to local communities, it will prevent the freshwater lakes 
from remaining commons and safety valves. Since a policy including all potential 
users will be impossible, the only solution to this dilemma is that government takes 
upon itself to assure that the collective concerns are voiced and taken into account.” 
In addition to the ‘temporal’ dimensions highlighted by Jul-Larsen et al. (2003) 
who show that fishing ‘community’ is in fact an evolving, dynamic, entity, both at 
the seasonal and long-term scale-, it is also important to highlight the ‘spatial’ 
dimension of the dynamics. In many inland fisheries in Africa, especially along 
rivers or floodplains areas, two different types of fishers usually ‘share’ the same 
resources – the local farmer-fishers or local full-time fishers, and the ‘migrant’ 
fishers, who come from another region or another country and stay in the area for 
a few months or several years. These migrant fishers are usually professional 
fishers, i.e. full-time fishers who live in temporary fisher camps and follow the 
resources in an opportunistic way. Again, the question arises: who is the fishing 8  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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community? Who is entitled to be the ‘representative’ of the ‘fishing community’ to 
which management responsibilities and decision-power will be devolved? The local 
fishers, who may fish only two months in the season but usually claim ‘historical 
rights’, or the full-time migrant fishers, who totally depend on the fishery for their 
income and livelihoods but who do not ‘belong’ to the ‘local’ population?  
Lessons from the CBFM project
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  CBFM  project  in  Bangladesh  provides  additional 
important lessons in relation to the social dimension of co-management reforms. 
This programme was based on a partnership between the Department of Fisheries 
(DoF), five local NGOs, an International Research Organization (the WorldFish 
Center) and the local communities of 19 water-bodies in Bangladesh. The project’s 
main objective was to develop institutional arrangements and foster capacity for 
devolving  responsibilities  for  managing  fisheries  to  the  user  communities 
(Thompson et al. 2004). 
The CBFM was initiated in 1996, and was still operating at the time of this review. 
It  received  significant  support.  For  the  first  six  years  (1996-2001)  the  overall 
budget was approximately US$1.8 million. A second phase was launched in 2002 
with a considerably larger budget of US$ 5.2 millions (P. Thompson, pers. comm. 
Dec. 2003). Perhaps more important than the level of financial support, is the 
continuity of institutional support provided to the actors involved in the project. 
The local communities have benefited from the continuous attention and support 
of several NGOs (18 in total), an international research organization and various 
international  experts  commissioned  by  the  donor  agencies.  Furthermore,  the 
programme has been running almost continuously for more than 8 years, which 
is a relatively substantial amount of time in comparison with the two to three 
year  period  that  characterizes  the  funding  arrangements  of  most  fisheries 
development projects.   
The project recorded some encouraging results. In several of the open beels, for 
instance,  self-assessments  using  the  framework  presented  in  Table  5  revealed 
significant increases between 1997 and 2001 in perceived levels of participation, 
influence, decision-making, fishery access and benefits for project participants 
and for other members of the community. The gains for project participants in 
decision-making, and control over resources were also significantly higher than 
for non-participants. Thompson and his co-authors concluded, “this indicates 
that CBFM has in some sites had a wider benefit of empowering poorer fishing 
households within local fishery management institutions” (Thompson et al. 2004 
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However, a recent review of the project reveals that despite these positive aspects, 
the percentage of households that participated at each site for the period 1995-
2001 was relatively low. It varied from 3% to 61%, with an average of 23%.16 
This  means  that,  in  spite  of  the  support,  assistance  and  incentives  provided 
through the programme, after five years, on average, less than one quarter of the 
households in the local communities participated in the programme. In other 
words,  while  some  positive  and  encouraging  outcomes  were  generated,  the 
project also clearly underlines the subtlety of community development and the 
consequent  difficulty  in  explaining  the  reasons  for  the  results  achieved.  In 
particular, the project’s results clearly shows that the degree of participation does 
not necessary explain the level of success of the activities, but is instead dependent 
on other factors. The case is a powerful example of the complexity of the state-
society-community relations, and underlines that no single model can explain 
these relations. 
The issue of the role of local elites is a particularly good illustration of this reality. 
As mentioned earlier, elite capture has been recognized in the literature as a major 
issue in the process of decentralization. It may therefore have seemed ‘wise’ and 
appropriate to design mechanisms of devolution that reduce or at least contain 
the  risk  of  ‘predation’  of  the  CBFM  project  by  the  local  elites.  However,  in 
Bangladeshi society – as in a large number of other societies, especially in Africa 
- the local elites should not be viewed in such simple terms. In many societies 
they are vital political and economic actors, who design and build the system, 
give it its ‘constitution’ and stability, and ensure that it functions. Were they 
removed, the whole system could collapse. As reported by Lewins and Mallick 
(2000 p.13), who assessed some of the sites included in the CBFM project:
“Proshika  [one  of  the  NGOs  involved  in  the  project]  recognises  the  need  to 
incorporate  the  elite  and  local  political  representatives  into  the  RMC  [River 
Management Committee]. It was considered crucial to work with the powerful and 
rich katha owners, for instance, if new management strategies [were] to incorporate 
controls on katha fishing and their placement.” (Abdur Rahman Proshika Fisheries 
co-ordinator, pers comm.)
Overall, one of the most important contributions of the CBFM programme to the 
debate on governance reform is therefore the attempt made to account for and 
monitor “equity” issues. In this respect, the framework proposed by the project to 
deconstruct and evaluate different dimensions of equity (Table 5) is a first very 
important step which needs to be acknowledged and publicized more broadly in 
the relevant literature. 
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What the project may have overlooked, however, is the accountability dimension 
of the process following power devolution. Indeed, accountability itself does not 
appear in the CBFM’s framework, while participation does. In effect however, this 
issue of accountability percolates recurrently through the CBFM project’s reports. 
Thompson et al. (2004, p.11-12), for instance, remarks that:
“… they [the River Management Committees] have been prone to new problems of 
internal factions that arise when NGOs promote more transparent and accountable 
leadership  including  elections.  Experience  indicates  that  it  is  important  for  the 
sustainability of such organizations either that the leadership is fixed (which tends 
to  concentrate  power  and  give  an  inequitable  distribution  of  benefits)  or  that 
leadership has the possibility to rotate sufficiently frequently through a democratic 
and transparent process. This may be achieved for instance by election every 1-2 years, 
so that power does not become polarized with one faction.”
As was highlighted in this report, elections are indeed one mechanism to ensure or 
even increase downward accountability. This last comment confirms the point made 
earlier, that the low participation rate in the management of the water-bodies may 
not be an issue in itself, as long as those who are actively involved in this management 
(i.e. the River Management Committees) are accountable to the rest of the community. 
In other terms, the CBFM project tends to confirm what other reviews on governance 
have highlighted (see p.34), that is, the key factor affecting the performance of a 
governance arrangement may not be the degree of participation per se, but the nature 
of the institutional settings that determine and enforce the degree of (downward) 
accountability of the decision-makers towards the local communities.  1 PArt	Iv	|	A	strategic	overview	of	future	information	needs	and	research	priorities
Part	Iv	-	A	strategic	overview	of	future	information
needs	and	research	priorities 
Design of a research agenda on “poverty alleviation in small-scale 
fisheries through appropriate changes in governance and 
management”
Introduction and methodology
In this last part of the document, the priorities and needs for future research in 
the area of ‘poverty alleviation and improved small-scale fisheries governance in 
developing  countries’  are  considered.  The  approach  that  has  been  taken  is 
essentially ‘strategic’ – in other words, an attempt has been made to take an 
overview of the situation and to focus on the ‘bigger picture’. The following three 
factors have determined the need to take a strategic approach:
•  there is a comprehensive body of literature on ‘governance’ in general and an 
emerging  literature  on  ‘fisheries  governance’,  both  of  which  need  to  be 
considered;
•  the review of the fisheries governance literature undertaken in this document 
has  helped  highlight  both  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  current 
knowledge and understanding in this area; 
•  there appears to be a lack of a ‘strategic’ overview of the information and 
knowledge required to develop appropriate governance systems for small-scale 
inland fisheries management in developing countries, with particular reference 
to poverty reduction.
There are a number of challenges in producing a strategic overview of information 
needs  and  research  priorities.  First,  the  present  review  has  confirmed  the 
conclusions  of  others,  that  ‘fisheries  governance’  is  complex  and  dynamic, 
reflecting  the  activities  of  the  society  that  it  seeks  to  regulate.  Secondly,  in 
comparison  with  ‘natural  sciences’,  there  appears  to  be  a  limited  number  of 
research methods to apply to the study of fisheries governance (e.g. how to define 
and then measure the performance of governance arrangements in relation to 
poverty  alleviation  criteria).  Thirdly,  the  apparent  complexity  associated  with 
fisheries governance arrangements and their effects is both a constraint and an 
opportunity  for  future  research.  On  one  hand,  the  difficulty  of  designing 
appropriate  research  methods  cannot  be  underestimated,  and  without  this 
essential underpinning, the knowledge base will almost certainly be deficient or 
biased.  On  the  other  hand,  real  world  governance  complexity  can  yield  new 
opportunities  for  development,  and  well-focused  and  timely  research  has  an 2  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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Level of activity narrative summary
development goal Poverty reduction in small-scale fisheries is achieved through 
appropriate changes in governance and fisheries management within 
the overall context provided by the sustainable development approach
Purpose (i)  Improved knowledge and understanding of the role of 
governance in the management of small-scale fisheries for 
poverty reduction is generated and disseminated
(ii)  Initiation of a policy development process, using new knowledge 
and understanding (above), to identify and evaluate pro-poor 
policy options and policy implementation approaches
(iii)  Implementation of policies for new and appropriate governance 
arrangements relevant to poverty alleviation in fisheries 
(promotion of changes and reform)
Activities and 
outputs
1.  Generation of new knowledge and understanding of fisheries 
governance for poverty alleviation
1.1.  Investigation of the conceptual and theoretical role of governance 
in natural resource management (especially small-scale fisheries) 
and poverty alleviation, in the specific context of developing 
countries characterized by low institutional capacities and 
generally weak overall governance
1.2.  Description and typology of the range of governance 
arrangements applied to natural resource management 
(especially small-scale fisheries) in developing countries
1..  Empirical analysis of the impact of governance arrangements on 
poverty alleviation (especially in fish-dependent communities), 
and investigation of the potential for change or reform 
2.  Policy process analysis and development of new approaches 
for pro-poor policy design and implementation 
2.1.  Description and characterization of relevant policy processes 
across a range of countries and governance arrangements, with 
particular reference to decision-making processes in relation to 
natural resources – and, in particular, to water and inland fisheries 
resources 
2.2.  Identification and analysis of factors which affect the ‘types’ of 
policy process, using an empirical evidence-based approach to 
investigate policy performance and options for change
2..  Identification of ‘best practice’ guidelines for ‘new approaches for 
pro-poor governance in small-scale fisheries’
3.  Capacity-building to support research and related policy 
processes:
.1.  Training in research methods for researchers covering policy 
analysis and institutional analysis
.2.  Capacity-building for policy-makers within key government 
organizations focusing on improvements in policy planning, 
design and implementation
..  Capacity-building for other stakeholders and relevant economic 
and civil society organizations
table	6.	logical	Framework	Approach	for	a	research	agenda	for	‘poverty	reduction	in	fisheries	through	
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important role to play in understanding the likely entry-points for future changes 
in government policy.
In an attempt to provide an initial strategic overview of future information needs 
and research priorities, a Logical Framework Approach (LFA) has been developed. 
It  presents  a  research  agenda  for  ‘poverty  alleviation  in  small-scale  fisheries 
through appropriate changes in governance and management’. The advantages of 
the LFA in this case include:
•  the major levels of activity (development goals, strategic issues and research 
contributions) can easily be discerned, and in particular, the contribution of 
research to policy development and the achievement of development goals 
can be identified;
•  the overall logic and the linkages between the different levels of activity can 
be understood;
•  the  contribution  of  existing  knowledge  and  the  possible  ‘gaps’  can  be 
identified;
•  the underlying assumptions and means of verification for entry at each level 
can be discerned (although not provided in this initial LFA).  
Research agenda
The proposed research agenda is presented in Table 6 in the form of a LFA. It 
highlights clearly the link between ‘research’ (programme activities and outputs) 
and ‘policy development and action’ (development goal and purpose). 
Development goal
The development goal of the agenda is ‘poverty alleviation in small-scale fisheries 
through appropriate changes in governance and fisheries management within the 
overall framework provided by the sustainable development approach’. 
There are a number of reasons for choosing this goal, which draw upon the main 
findings of this document. First, it is relevant both at the national level for many 
developing countries in relation to their individual Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers and National Poverty Reduction Strategies, and internationally in relation 
to  the  new  agenda  on  poverty  alleviation  of  the  bilateral  and  international 
development agencies (notably through the Millennium Development Goals). 
Secondly,  small-scale  fisheries  have  been  identified  as  a  specific  area  where 
poverty  alleviation  is  required  and  justified  (FAO  2003;  World  Bank  2004). 
Thirdly, in its present formulation, the development goal of the research agenda 
highlights the importance of the linkage between poverty alleviation and the 
need for appropriate changes in governance and fisheries management. In other   WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
  Governance reforms in fisheries: a critical review
words, there is no assumption about a ‘blueprint’ for these relationships to cover 
all parts of the world; instead locally adapted governance arrangements should 
be the priority. Fourthly, the terms ‘governance’ and ‘fisheries management’ have 
been included separately to indicate that these are distinct, although inter-related, 
concepts that need to be treated as such. Fifthly, although fishery is the key entry-
point  for  the  research  agenda,  the  goal  incorporates  the  wider  context  of 
sustainable development and the inter-relationship among fisheries and other 
sectors of the economy.
Purpose
The development goal can only be achieved if the purpose is realized. This purpose 
has three components:
(i)  improved knowledge and understanding of the role of governance in the 
management of fisheries for poverty alleviation 
(ii)  initiation  of  a  policy  development  process,  by  which  pro-poor  policy 
options and implementation approaches are identified and evaluated 
(iii)  implementation  of  policies  for  new  and  appropriate  governance 
arrangements relevant to poverty alleviation in fisheries.
The implementation of policies for new and appropriate governance arrangements 
leading to poverty alleviation in fisheries will depend on policy-makers having 
relevant information and knowledge. In the first instance, for most developing 
countries, this will require capacity-building in a wide range of areas including 
policy  analysis,  institutional  analysis  and  the  management  of  policy 
implementation and change. It will also depend on policy-makers and stakeholders 
engaging  in  policy  and  governance  debates  and  following  through  with 
institutional (and possibly legislative) reforms. 
Activities/outputs
Directly supporting the three purpose components, the activities/outputs fall into 
three broad categories:
1.  Improved understanding of fisheries governance for poverty alleviation.
2.  Policy  process  analysis  and  development  of  new  approaches  for  pro-poor 
policy design and implementation.
3.  Capacity-building to support research and policy processes. 
Before specifying the content of each of the above, it is important to point out 
three factors that have shaped the design of the research agenda. First, the review 
has helped to pinpoint important areas of work based on an implicit assessment  PArt	Iv	|	A	strategic	overview	of	future	information	needs	and	research	priorities
of the status of knowledge. Secondly, the research activities will have to include 
both  ‘conventional’  research  (leading  to  knowledge  generation)  and  ‘action’ 
research  (integrated  within  the  policy  process  itself,  answering  questions  in 
response to needs as they arise, and possibly incorporating a ‘learning process’ 
and step-wise approach to the methodology employed). Thirdly, the research 
activities have been specified in response to a development goal leading eventually 
to poverty alleviation, rather than a more general goal of ‘knowledge generation’. 
The research proposed is therefore both targeted and applied in nature.     
Improved understanding of fisheries governance for poverty alleviation  
The first set of activities focuses on improved knowledge and understanding of 
fisheries governance for poverty alleviation. The work proposed in this area will 
aim to extend the existing knowledge about fisheries governance and poverty, and 
fill some of the important gaps in knowledge that currently exist. Three important 
and inter-related components for this set of activities include:
 
1.1.  Investigation of the conceptual and theoretical role of governance in natural 
resource  management  (especially  in  small-scale  fisheries)  and  poverty 
alleviation in the specific context of developing countries characterized by 
low institutional capacities and generally weak overall governance.
1.2.  Description and typology of the range of governance arrangements applied 
in  natural  resource  management  (especially  in  small-scale  fisheries)  in 
these developing countries.
1.3.  Empirical analysis of the impact of governance arrangements on poverty 
alleviation in natural resource dependent communities (especially in fish-
dependent communities) and the potential for initiating changes.
This first set of activities should build upon the findings provided by the present 
governance  review  through  a  series  of  entry  points.  First,  Part  I:  Governance 
explored the concepts and theory presented in the literature, but also identified 
some inconsistencies and paradigm shifts which demand further investigation in 
order  to  bring  fisheries  in  line  with  the  general  understanding  of  the  wider 
governance and poverty issues. Second, while the review has presented some 
detailed examples and case-studies from within the fisheries sector (e.g. pp.46-49), 
or even outside fisheries (e.g. Box 2 up to Box 10) there is still a need to extend 
this work and to investigate a broader range of real-world examples to form a 
basis for international lesson-learning. Third, the review has also highlighted the 
difficulty of making effective changes in governance, focusing in particular on the 
experience of decentralization (Part II: Changes in Governance p.14). This suggests 
that there is a need for a better understanding, based on empirical work, of the 
pre-existing relations between governance arrangements and fisheries management 
performance. The acquisition of further knowledge in this area could provide a 6  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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basis for future governance changes or reforms. For this, research in the current 
range of natural resource management sciences (e.g. fish ecology, natural resource 
economics, socio-economics or even socio-anthropology) should be expanded to 
include research in policy and political sciences and related disciplines (e.g. policy 
analysis, political economy, political ecology) – it is important to recognize the 
contribution of all these different disciplines and the perspectives which they 
provide in helping to understanding the operation of natural resource systems 
(NR-societal interactions). Therefore, it is suggested that for research carried out 
under Activity 1, appropriate study methodologies would have to be developed 
using a multi-disciplinary approach and combining qualitative and quantitative 
approaches as appropriate. Within this domain some specific research questions 
might include:
•  Are  the  biophysical  or  ecological  characteristics  of  the  resource  a  factor 
influencing  the  type  (or  degree)  of  governance  reform  that  should  be 
implemented? For instance should decentralization (type, form, level) for a 
floodplain fishery be the same as that for a lake fishery? 
•  What are the appropriate -or ‘best’ adapted- governance arrangements/tools 
under different fishery exploitation scenarios (e.g. over-fished, actively fished, 
under-fished fisheries)? For instance, should the involvement of the central 
authority stay the same as the fishery develops from an under-developed to 
fully developed activity? 
•  Are the three ‘liberal’ pillars of good governance (accountability, transparency 
and participation) the most important factors to ensure successful governance 
in natural resource management (or do these concepts refer to Western values 
which are not necessary relevant elsewhere, e.g. in the context of developing 
countries)? How should the statist elements of good governance (authority, 
order, capability and autonomy) be included?
•  Is the existence of traditional authorities a good foundation for pro-poor (or 
improved) governance, and if so how can traditional leaders be incorporated as 
a third key actor, in such a way that the new arrangements will benefit the poor 
and/or  most  marginalized  sector  of  the  population?  In  other  words,  how 
important  is  the  pre-existing  ‘political  architecture’  to  the  performance  of 
fisheries  management  and  can  these  arrangements  be  used  to  improve  or 
change matters? 
Policy analysis and new approaches for pro-poor policy process
The second group of activities focuses on analysis of the policy process and the 
search for new approaches to ‘pro-poor’ policy design and implementation. This 
work will build upon the increased understanding of the relationship between 
governance arrangements and fisheries management performance generated by 
the first group of activities. At the core of the second set of activities are issues and 7 PArt	Iv	|	A	strategic	overview	of	future	information	needs	and	research	priorities
questions  about  the  inter-relationships  between  policy,  management  and 
governance processes. This second set of activities will need to address three inter-
related components: 
2.1.  Description  and  characterization  of  policy  processes  across  a  range  of 
countries  and  governance  arrangements,  with  particular  reference  to 
decision-making processes relating to natural resources – particularly, water 
and inland fisheries resources.
2.2. Identification and analysis of factors affecting the ‘types’ of policy process, 
using  an  empirical  evidence-based  approach  to  document  policy 
performance. Our emphasis on the need for this ‘evidence-based approach’ 
lies in the recognition that although an increasing number of documents 
proposed in the literature claim to be policy analyses, these tend to be 
superficial and not systematically based on or backed-up with empirical 
evidence (but use instead weak secondary sources). Even when there is a 
good appreciation of the factors affecting policy performance, the subsequent 
investigation and analysis is often lacking.
2.3. Identification of best practice guidelines for ‘new policy approaches for 
pro-poor governance in small-scale fisheries’. There is an urgent need to 
develop  policy  guidelines  on  key  factors  and  principles  based  on  the 
improved understanding generated through components (2.1) and (2.2). 
These guidelines would help policy-makers at national and international 
levels  to  ensure  that  fisheries  policy  frameworks  support  pro-poor 
governance arrangements. 
This second set of activities would build upon the key findings of the current 
governance review, while also placing them within a more general ‘policy analysis’ 
framework. Three points are relevant to this approach. 
First, a comparison of policy processes in different situations around the world 
would help to provide a better understanding of the key factors that affect policy 
design and implementation in general. Secondly, many of the factors already 
identified as important in governance reform (e.g. participation, key actors and 
power relations), and discussed in Part II and Part III of this report, can be usefully 
analyzed within a policy process framework (specifically to understand how, why 
and  by  whom  policy  decisions  are  taken?).  Thirdly,  this  report  has  clearly 
identified a lack of empirical work in areas related to governance reforms in 
fisheries, and their impacts on poverty alleviation and equity (Part III, pp.43-45). 
It is proposed, therefore, to extend the empirical work on governance reforms 
within a policy analysis framework to develop ‘best practice pro-poor policy 
guidelines’. Within this context, some of the more specific questions that might 
be investigated could include:8  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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•   Does  ‘good  governance’  and  participation  systematically  improve  natural 
resource management (and in particular small-scale fisheries)? What empirically-
based methods can be employed to assess this, and how can the results be used 
to inform and improve the operation of the relevant policy process? 
•   In a symmetrical way, do ‘good governance’ and participation, as promoted 
through co-management arrangements, systematically improve access to the 
resources  by  the  poorest  and  more  marginalized?  What  empirically-based 
methods can be employed to assess this, and how can the results be used to 
inform and improve the operation of the relevant policy process?
•   How is the policy process relevant to governance in small-scale fisheries affected 
by  exogenous  and  endogenous  changes  (e.g.  nation-wide  decentralization 
reforms,  trade  liberalization,  land  or  water  tenure  reforms,  increasing 
competition for water, productive limits of ecosystems), and how do the various 
decision-makers and stakeholders react and cope with these effects? 
•   Does capacity building automatically lead to improved (pro-poor) governance 
and/or better policy process? 
Capacity-building for policy improvement
The third set of activities focuses on building the capacity to support both research 
and the expected changes in policy processes. While the first set of activities 
(governance  research)  and  the  second  set  (research  on  policy  process  for 
governance reform) can both be viewed as conventional applied research, the 
third  set  of  activities  (capacity-building)  is  not  a  research  component  per  se 
(although, as emphasized above, it will still require some research to help define 
and assess capacity-building needs which can underpin and support the other 
two activities). The third set of activities, however, is linked to research in the 
sense that it has the potential to close the gap between researchers and other 
stakeholders  involved  in  the  policy  process.  By  increasing  the  capacity  of 
organizations  and  their  constituent  stakeholders  to  participate  in  the  policy 
process at different levels, to use information and to assess and choose policy 
options, the likelihood of achieving improved governance that ensures effective 
fisheries  management  performance  will  be  increased.  Three  inter-related 
components can be included in this set of activities. They are:
3.1.  Training in research methods for researchers, covering areas such as policy 
process analysis and institutional analysis.
3.2.  Capacity-building for policy-makers within key local, district and national 
government organizations in order to create mechanisms for the effective 
use of the research findings and to enable improvements in policy planning, 
design and implementation.
3.3.  Capacity-building  for  other  stakeholders  and  relevant  organizations 
concerned with, or affected by, governance reform. This could cover a wide 9 PArt	Iv	|	A	strategic	overview	of	future	information	needs	and	research	priorities
range of activities such as leadership training, organization management 
and advocacy. In effect, the range of capacity-building domains included in 
the agenda should respond to the need to integrate research into the policy 
process relevant to governance reform, and enable a large number of actors 
engaged in the policy process at different levels to access and use research 
information to an increasing extent.
How does this third set of activities relate to the findings of this governance 
review? First, it is clear that fisheries governance is a growing area of research and 
the methodologies required to extend this work will need further development 
and dissemination. Researchers will need training in new concepts, methods and 
approaches.  Secondly,  in  many  parts  of  the  world,  government  institutions 
responsible for policy-making lack the essential capacity to develop a programme 
of governance reform. One of the most vital elements missing appears to be the 
capacity to undertake cross-sectoral analysis of key issues. Pro-poor governance 
issues in small-scale fisheries are, however, very often related to issues and/or 
processes outside the fisheries sector itself, such as water governance. Thirdly, as 
highlighted by the lessons drawn from co-management experiences (Part III), 
capacity-building  initiatives  covering  a  wide  range  of  stakeholders  are  often 
difficult  to  implement  and  there  is  no  guarantee  of  success.    The  nature  of 
development change as a ‘process’ (e.g. improved governance leading to poverty 
reduction) will require an increased level of human capital. The pathway and 
speed of the process is unpredictable, and the best one can hope for is to create an 
enabling environment in which governance changes supporting the Millennium 
Development Goals and sustainable development principles are encouraged.60  WorldFish	Center	| Challenge	Program	on	Water	and	Food 
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This report discusses the role, nature and mechanisms of governance in inland 
fisheries. After reviewing the wider concepts of governance, participation and 
co-management in natural resource management, the report then focuses on 
small-scale fisheries and, in particular, on inland artisanal fisheries operating in 
developing countries.
Drawing upon lessons from the literature outside the fisheries sector, the fist part 
of the report reviews and discusses the definitions of governance and ‘good’ 
governance, and highlights some of the main issues related to these concepts, 
before focusing more specifically on issues related to these concepts in fisheries. 
The analysis reveals, in particular, the frequent confusion that is made in the 
fisheries literature between ‘management’ and ‘governance’ and argues that the 
two concepts should be used distinctly.
Part II discusses in greater details governance mechanisms and reforms. The 
report concentrates initially on cases of decentralization reforms in sectors other 
than fisheries and reviews some of the positive but also negative consequences 
of those types of governance reforms. We then focus more specifically on two 
governance  mechanisms,  participation  and  accountability.  The  report  shows 
that while participatory processes can play a key role in improving governance, 
these approaches will not benefit the end-users (and in particular the poor) unless 
efficient downward accountability mechanisms are put in place.
Part III of the report discusses governance reform—in particular co-management—
in fisheries, and raises a series of questions about the implementation of this 
concept for the artisanal fisheries of developing countries. The analysis shows 
that  the  conceptualization  of  co-management  as  currently  presented  in  the 
literature does not provide a particularly useful framework to analyze the reasons 
for success or failure of current decentralization programs in fisheries. The review 
demonstrates that by focusing exclusively on the level of participation as the key-
explanatory element of success (or failure) of these reforms, the current approach 
to co-management neglects some of the other crucial dimensions of governance 
and overlooks the real effect of these reforms on equity and poverty (alleviation).
Part IV draws upon the lessons derived from the three previous sections and 
develops a series of questions for future research. The section highlights the 
role that such research should play in the debate about governance in natural 
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